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 The Achaean League successfully extended its membership to poleis who did not 
traditionally share any affinity with the Achaean ethnos.  This occurred, against the 
current of traditional Greek political development, due to a fundamental restructuring of 
political power within the poleis of the Peloponnesus.  Due to Hellenistic, and 
particularly Macedonian intervention, most Peloponnesian poleis were directed by tyrants 
who could make decisions based on their sole judgments.  The Achaean League 
positioned itself to directly influence those tyrants.  The League offered to maintain the 
tyrants within their poleis so long as they joined the League, or these tyrants faced 
relentless Achaean attacks and assassination attempts.  Through the consent of this small 
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The Achaean League’s historical significance lay in its unique political structure 
which managed to unite most of the poleis within the Peloponnesus into one government.  
For over a century, the Achaean political system incorporated a number of notoriously 
fractious Hellenic poleis.  The Achaeans achieved such a feat through aggressive and 
dynamic strategies of unity.  These strategies were political programs of foreign and 
domestic content with social consequences.  Leading Achaean statesmen made policy 
choices which helped define how Achaeans were perceived by themselves and outsiders.   
The main obstacle to the union of so many poleis was the large stock individual 
Greeks put into their local polis as the definer of their self-identity.  When the autonomy 
of one’s city holds a central place in one’s self-worth, the ability to effectively unite with 
a larger confederation becomes nearly impossible.  The Achaean political system had the 
task of appeasing enough of that particularistic sentiment in enough of its individual 
citizen members.  But at the same time it had to maintain sufficient coercive power to act 
as an effective government.  The balancing act, though difficult, was eased through the 
circumstances of the Hellenistic period. 
Quite naturally, over the course of the tumultuous Hellenistic period the strategies 
varied according to the specific circumstances and general zeitgeist.  One may detect 
broad trends, however, which divide the Achaean League’s Hellenistic period into two 
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eras.  On the one hand there is the early period, which was characterized by dominating 
individuals. The most notable among them was Aratus of Sicyon.  In a world full of 
tyrants, the focus of Achaean politics was on the supreme elites within the various poleis.  
The League grew and maintained itself on the acquiescence of the tyrant class of Hellas, 
those individuals and families who disproportionately benefited from the influx of wealth 
after the death of Alexander.  By presenting the choice of the possibility of supreme 
office in a greater polity or targeted political assassination, the League gained many new 
adherents.  This general focus worked well for several decades, but the Cleomenean War 
(229-222 BCE) exposed the fragile nature of this unity.   
The ejection of Macedonian power, after the seizure of the Acrocorinth, had 
changed the political dynamics in unanticipated ways.  Most Hellenic tyrants had local 
support structures; it would be impossible to govern for long without them.  However, 
they also relied on the implicit and sometimes explicit promise of Macedonian military 
aid to maintain their positions of power.  These elites of the tyrant class remained in 
charge of their polities, even as they joined their cities to the League.  The Achaeans 
attempted to serve a similar role to the Macedonians in the Peloponnese, yet lacked the 
same military resources.  When challenged by Cleomenes III, the self-interested loyalty 
of the supreme elites from the newly joined poleis did not hold the League together.  
Only the reintroduction of outside military power from Macedonia and later Rome gave 
the League the space to continue its developments as a federation. 
After a period of transition, the Achaean League emerged as a dependent 
protectorate of their former enemy.  The Cleomenean War and its aftermath proved to be 
the fulcrum after which, the League refocused its strategies upon a broader swath of the 
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Achaean citizenry.  The shared federal rights to movement, property and intermarriage 
became increasingly important to binding more individuals to the concept of a federal 
citizenship.  These rights had existed in the early League, but only the supreme political 
elites had the economic ability and desire to take advantage of them.    
A growing sense of Achaean political identity allowed for greater attempts to 
forge national institutions.  The greatest expression of citizenship, the army, was 
standardized in this period under the leadership of Philopoemen.  The renewed focus on a 
broader base of the League’s population was made possible through the assistance of a 
protecting power of first, Macedonia, and then, Rome.  As the benefits of association 
became manifest to a greater swath of the League’s citizens, the onerous burdens of the 
state lightened under foreign tutelage.  These innovations and institutions were native and 
praiseworthy, but required outside support to bear fruit in a highly hostile international 









THE EARLY LEAGUE 
 
The Achaean League held an insubstantial place within the normal currents of 
Hellenic political and social life.  From the first known habitation until the admission of 
Sicyon into the fold of the League, Achaea operated in the same way as many other 
ethnic confederations of Central Greece.  Achaea represented a weak set of communities, 
many of which did not deserve the appellation of polis until late in the Classical period.  
These communities attempted to achieve strength and security through unity.  The bonds 
of their confederation followed the conventional Greek custom for associating groups of 
people together: kinship.  The concept of intraethnic cooperation held the Achaeans 
together, for the most part, for many centuries and induced the reconstitution of their 
confederation after its dissolution during the chaos of the wars of the Diadochi. 
 
The Original Achaean League 
 To understand fully the project of the Hellenistic restoration, one must examine 
the original league which was to be restored.  By most measures, the Achaean League 
was a traditional ethnic koinon.  Sitting along the southern coast of the Corinthian gulf, 
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the League in its early existence did not even deserve the accolade of a league of poleis.  
Twelve mera, or districts, made up the constituent units of the League.
1
  Exchanging 
foreign policy independence for mutual support, the Achaean ethnos forged a precarious 
position between their more powerful neighbors: Elis, the Arcadian poleis, and Sicyon.  
 This arrangement into a federation was far from a unique feature in the Hellenic 
landscape.  For several centuries before Philip and Alexander, ethnic koina, or tribal 
federations, flourished in Central Greece.  The Greeks had integrated ethnicity into their 
understanding of themselves from at least as early as the Archaic period.  The definite 
references to regional tribes within the “Catalogue of Ships” in Homer’s Iliad 
demonstrate as much.
2
   
In general, ethnicity may be defined as the ascription of a shared ancestor and/or 
shared homeland on all the individuals within a bounded group, with special emphasis on 
the former.  There are other factors such as a shared history, a distinctive and shared 
culture (including language) and a sense of common solidarity, but most important is a 
putative common ancestor and homeland.
3
  A tie of blood kinship was a powerful 
concept within Hellenic society. While a nebulous idea of Hellenic unity existed, 
personified in the mythological son of Zeus, Hellen, most Greeks looked to another 
figure further down Hellen’s family tree as an ethnic progenitor.  A few Greeks even 
looked to figures outside of the traditional Hellenic bloodline.
4
 
                                                             
1
Herodotus, 1.146.  A meros might be a polis, but it was not necessarily so. 
2
Homer, Iliad, Book 2.  The debate over the dating of the catalogue is not appropriate here, but as no one 
maintains its creation after the Archaic period, I feel safe in my assertion. 
3
 Jonathan Hall, Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity, (Cambridge: 1997), 25.   
4
Most prominently the Arcadians, Hall, Ethnic Identity, 171. 
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For the Achaeans that progenitor was the eponymous Achaeaus, son of Xuthus, 
and grandson of Hellen.
5
  Achaeaus was the brother of Ion, forerunner of the Ionians, and 
nephew to Dorus and Aeolus, eponymous founders of the Dorians and Aeolians, 
respectively.
6
  These four sons and grandsons of Hellen compose the four main branches 
of the Hellenic community, each with its own dialect.
7
  Situated within this lineage, the 
Achaeans had both this asserted kinship relationship and an associated mythology for 
how the people of Achaeaus came to be and how they moved to their home.  After much 
mischief, the sons of Achaeaus made their home in Argos and later, Lacedaemon.
8
  The 
famous Achaeans of Homer’s epics are identified with this group.  According to the 
mythological account, those heroes found difficult circumstances when they arrived 
home from Troy, and subsequent generations experienced a mythological deluge, the 
return of the Heraclidae and their Dorian allies. 
The final element in the ethno-genesis legend is the expulsion of the Achaeans 
from Argos and Sparta and the Achaean invasion and expulsion in turn, of the Ionians 
from the region known as Aegialus.  This region became known as Achaea, a name 
which persists to the present day.  This legend is widely reported, with the earliest 
instance coming from Herodotus.
9
  Even Polybius notes that it was the son of Orestes 
who led the Achaeans to their homeland, and founded the royal line which was only 
                                                             
5
This is the typical family tree given in Apollodorus, 1.7.3.  Also Pausanias, 7.1.2-3.  Like all myths, there 










Herodotus, 1.145.  Also Pausanias, 7.1.8, where Tisamenus, son of Orestes, offers peaceful settlement to 
the Ionians, which is rejected through a fear of his charisma and noble lineage. 
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ended by the introduction of democracy.
10
  In this way, the Achaean community could 
assert their unity from this initial group under the leadership of a famous royal family.   
They could further claim their homeland on the basis of conquest.   
It is interesting to note the closeness with which the Ionians and Achaeans are 
portrayed.  Their eponymous ancestors were brothers, and more closely related to each 
other than to their uncles, and hence, the peoples of Aeolus and Dorus.  The Achaeans 
inhabited the former land of the Ionians, who were in turn forced to flee through Attica to 
Anatolia.  Finally, the Achaean polis of Helice, which fell into the sea after an earthquake 
in 373 BCE, held in its territory the sacred precinct of Zeus Homarius, the meeting place 
of the Achaeans.
11
  This polis served, in myth, as the rallying point to the Ionians during 
their migration, and the earthquake is said to have resulted from an Achaean denial of 
certain sacred objects which the Ionians had requested be returned in that year.
12
  This 
example stands as fossilized evidence of some attempt to connect self-described Ionians 
and Achaeans. 
These fictive kinship ties were the binding forces which held the Achaea ethnos 
together despite the mountain ranges which separated the individual mera.
13
  A common 
foundation legend was absolutely necessary to allow for greater cooperation, because of 
the devastating particularism which saturated the Hellenic mind.  Unity allowed for 
strength, but undermined autonomy at the local level.  This tension exists in most human 
societies but had a notable stranglehold on Greek political practice down to their 
                                                             
10
Polybius, 2.41.4, F.W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius (Oxford: 1970), 229. 
11
Pausanias, 7.24.6-24.13 for the earthquake narrative.   
12
Herodotus, 1.145. 
13J K Anderson, “A Topographical and Historical Study of Achaea,” The Annual of the British School at  
Athens. vol. 49, (1954), 74, where he notes the four discrete geographical units in which the region is 
divided, particularly the western and eastern extremes, with Dyme, placed on the one end and Pellene on 
the other, which truly stands isolated from the two central plains. 
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conquest and annexation, in part or fully, by the Persians, Macedonians and ultimately 
the Romans.
14
  The Greeks could only form more cohesive bonds under certain 
circumstances.  Either a group of poleis felt that an external power threatened their 
autonomy far more than cooperation with their neighbors (which happened in the case of 
the loose league which repelled the Persians),
15
 or some poleis felt a trust among 
themselves, stemming from kinship, which made such a close union acceptable.   
Ethnicity in the Hellenic context represents one of many layers to an individual’s 
identity.  Along with his ethnos, a Greek felt some loyalty to his identity to the greater 
Hellenic community.  But the stronger loyalties were typically more local.  A Greek also 
defined himself in terms of his polis, his phyle, his phratry and his genos, if he belonged 
to one.
16
  Alongside this set of groups developed the somewhat class based social 
associations which the labels democratic and oligarchic came to represent.  All of these 
groups influenced each individual Greek’s overall self-identity, and when one loyalty 
came into conflict with another, one was bound to weaken.   
The Greeks were far from unusual in possessing a multilayered, complex self-
identity.  All human beings construct their identity in this way.  Modern investigations 
into the relationship between the individual and larger groups, most especially a national 
group, have found that identities are constructed from multiple sources and are also 
situational.
17
  This is not to say that one’s self-identity may be made or unmade at a 
                                                             
14
The Persians did not conquer all of Greece, but did control many eastern Greeks through encouraging the 
ruinous wars between Athens and Sparta and later, Thebes and Sparta.  The Macedonians, whatever their 
true ethnic relationship to the Hellenic world, represented a far different political order during their 
conquest of Greece.  
15
Even in this case, many poleis chose neutrality or alliance with the Persians, rather than assist bitter rivals. 
16
John V A Fine, The Ancient Greeks: A Critical History (Cambridge, 1983), 34.  Not every ethnic Greek 
was admitted to each subgroup.  In particular, generally wealthy aristocratic Greeks were part of a genos. 
17




whim, but depending on the situation, one may alter certain aspects of how one 
understands one’s self.  One may emphasize one aspect of an identity over another, or 
abandon certain aspects altogether.  One might also, critically for this work, add new 
aspects to one’s identity, such as many individual Peloponnesians did when they vowed 
through a sacred oath to take the name and the laws of the Achaeans.
18
   
If an ethnic connection existed for enough individuals, then the possibility existed 
to form an ethnic federation.  However, the formation of such an ethnic federation 
represented a response to the general weakness of a particular group.  Consanguine 
considerations were not predictive on their own of interpoleis cooperation, or even 
intrapolis relations. 
The stronger an individual center or polis, the less ethnic ties convinced that 
center to cooperate with other consanguine states.  Rather, a strong center could, and did, 
project its power to dominate its surrounding area, instead of allowing those areas to 
participate voluntarily.  Phocis, a typical central Greek ethnic state, covered an area of 
roughly 1600 km
2
 with no dominant center.
19
  Sparta, the proverbial super state of ancient 
Greece, covered the bottom half of the Peloponnesus.  It dominated three separate 
regions, Laconia, Messenia and the Thyreatis, with the ruling polis of Sparta at its center.  
Satellite and dependent communities existed within Sparta’s own valley and conquered 
communities without.  This control was predicated not on consanguinity but on the 
martial prowess of the Spartan polity, which subjugated portions of its own population 
into helot status, conquered and annexed a neighboring state with which it did assert a 
                                                             
18
As attested in the Orchomenean decree, W. Dittenberger, Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum, 3
rd
 ed. 
(Leipzig:1915-1924), 490.  
19
 McInerney, Folds of Parnassos, 41. 
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common ancestor, and annexed another region with which it did not.
20
  Meanwhile, 
consanguine Argos stood within its territory as the implacable foe to the Spartans, despite 
the mythological fraternity of their respective Dorian leaders.  All of this stands in stark 
contrast to Phocis, which could not even dominate the whole of the geographically 




As previously mentioned, ethnicity was one part of a complex identity.  To better 
understand the power and limitations of Greek ethnicity, some examples of its effects and 
functions are beneficial.  At the strong end stands the Phocians during the Persian Wars.  
Their participation has seldom received much attention, beyond their failure at 
Thermopylae.  The Phocian decision to aid the allied poleis was made certain when their 
hated neighbors, the Thessalians, submitted to the Persians after being overrun.
22
  It had 
not been long since Phocis had thrown off the yoke of Thessaly, and this victory had 
become central to the understanding of the Phocian identity.
23
  Whoever the Thessalians 
supported, the Phocians would oppose. So strongly was the position held, that after the 
pass at Thermopylae fell, the Phocians refused to submit.  All Phocians in the path of the 
Persian army fled to the heights of Mt. Parnassos.
24
  They did not need to resist.  The 
Thebans, who had also fought at the battle, chose to submit and were treated well.  So 
too, were the Dorians just west of the Phocians, as well as many other ethne in central 
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The Helots of Laconia, Messenia and Kynuria.  Herodotus asserts the Kynurians as an ethnically distinct 
people in 8.73 and Thucydides in 5.14.4 discusses the Argive desire to take this region back from the 
Spartans. 
21












  The Phocians were bound to oppose the Thessalian supported Persians by their 
understanding of what it was to be Phocian. 
Examples at the opposite end of the scale are plentiful.  Dorians and Ionians only 
had common government in small areas, which were far from encompassing the whole 
community.  These communities were scattered, however, and their disunion was 
reasonable.  More interesting are the ethne which did occupy a geographically contiguous 
region, but who failed to unite.  The Arcadians fit this description well. 
The Arcadian ethnos does not fit neatly into the Hellenic genealogy.  Purportedly 
descended from Arcas, descendent of Pelasgus, the Arcadians are not related to Hellen.
26
  
They claimed to be autochthonous.  The power of the Hellenic genealogy was strong, 
however, and certain Arcadians claimed it.  Looking at the ethnicity of Olympic victors 
from its inception down to the fifth century, they overwhelmingly spring from the four 
main stems of the Hellenic geneology.
27
  The remaining winners derive from a few 
families within the two regions of Arcadia and Locris.
28
  Clearly some Arcadian families 
invented “Hellenic” progenitors to satisfy the Hellanodikai, just as Herodotus reports of 
Alexander I of Macedonia.
29
   
Despite a serious attempt at unity, Arcadia remained fragmented until its 
incorporation into the Achaean League of the Hellenistic Age.  The region they inhabited 
is large and mountainous, which certainly contributed to particularism, but they were not 
much worse off than the better united Achaeans.  The difficulty lay in the powerful poleis 






The previously named Dorians, Ionians, Achaeans and Aeolians. 
28
Hall, Hellenicity, 163, within Arcadia, these were Phigaleia, Heraea, Mantineia and Stymphalus, with 





on the eastern plain, Tegea and Mantineia.  The most serious attempt at unity occurred 
during the period of Theban ascendency in the mid-fourth century BCE.  Nudged by their 
powerful Theban ally, hatred for their Spartan enemy and bound by ties of kinship, the 
Arcadians founded a new federal capital for themselves in western Arcadia, 
Megalopolis.
30
  The newly unified league was powerful and assertive.  In one of the more 
obvious cases of ethnic manipulation, they annexed by invitation the region of Triphylia, 
formally controlled by Elis.  The Triphylians claimed that their progenitor, Triphylus, 
was a son of the Arcas.
31
  The Arcadians happily accepted their long lost cousins into the 
fold and seized the opportunity to expand.  Adding insult to injury, the Arcadians even 
deprived Elis of the stewardship of the Olympic Games.
32
  But after a few years of vigor, 
the Arcadian League fell into internal disputes between its chief poleis.
33
  Megalopolis 
would continue to assert its place as the capital of a united Arcadia, but was insufficiently 
powerful to compel the rest of the Arcadians into agreeing.  Despite the proven 
advantages of combined action, the poleis of Arcadia valued autonomy more highly. 
Moving past the concept of an ethnos and the relative power of ethnic identity, the 
region of Achaea had long been a regional backwater.  Described as dependent on 
Mycenae in the Iliad, material culture suggests that Achaea was within the Mycenaean 
orbit, though political subordination cannot be proved.
34
  The region remained 
underdeveloped into the archaic period, with only a few centers keeping relative pace 
with the rate of Hellenic urban development.
35
  When Achaea emerged into the historical 









34Anderson, “Study of Achaea,” 72. 
35Catherine Morgan, “Politics without Polis: Cities and the Achaean Ethnos, c.800-500 BC,” Alternatives to 
Athens: Varieties of Political Organization and Community in Ancient Greece (New York: 2000), 210. 
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record, it represented a regional unit, connected in some sort of common government.  
What sort of connection is uncertain, but as Polybius suggests, the Achaean sense of 
unity was old by the classical period.
36
   
 As a peripheral Peloponnesian state, Achaea maintained a general policy of 
neutrality when practicable, but was often forced into involuntary alliances during the 
Classical period.  This placed a strain on the cohesion of the League, as it demonstrated 
the insufficient strength of even the collective Achaean ethnos.  Several examples exist of 
major powers dealing directly with specific Achaean poleis, ignoring the League.  
Initially, Athens forced the Achaeans into dependent status during the formative years of 
the Delian League.
37
  This would not last as a stipulation of the Thirty Years Peace 
negotiated in 446 dictated that Athens would relinquish their posts: Nisaea, Pegae, 
Troezen and Achaea.
38
  One may wonder at the description of the Athenians holding the 
whole of Achaea, just as they did the ports of Megara and the Argolid polis of Troezen.
39
   
From total Athenian subjugation, Achaea again attempted to maintain a neutrality 
through the rising tensions which proceeded the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. As 
in earlier times, this neutrality was often violated.  The tensions of that war brought about 
a weakening of League collectivity.  The conflict along the Corinthian Gulf coast saw 
Peloponnesian armies and vessels traversing League land at will.
40
  The Athenians under 
Alcibiades completely ignored the League as he, with his Argive allies, pressured Patrae 
                                                             
36
Polybius, 2.41.4-5, Walbank, Commentary I, 229. 
37
Plutarch, Pericles, 19.4.  Achaeans are friendly to Pericles.  Thucydides 1.111.3, Pericles takes them as 
allies to attack Oeniadae. 
38
Thucydides, 1.115.1. 





to build long walls in the Athenian style.
41
  These incidents eroded confidence in the 
League as the best means to maintaining security.
42
 
The League would gain some much needed stability in 417 from external forces.  
In the wake of Sparta’s victory at the Battle of Mantinea, the high tide of Athenian 
influence in the Peloponnese was ended.  Sparta acted to perpetuate the situation through 
the imposition of oligarchic regimes across the region.  The most prominent change was 
in Argos, but Thucydides left a single sentence regarding Achaea, asserting that the 
Spartans settled things to their liking.
43
  Though vague, it is easy to infer the meaning of 
the sentence.  The Spartans established some form of oligarchy, ending the formally pro-
Athenian democratic governments.  Afterward, Achaea played a consistent and 
increasingly significant role as Spartan ally.  This governmental reorganization had far 
reaching consequences.  The character of Achaean politics would remain oligarchic in 
outlook down through the Roman period.
44
 
Immediately after the war, the place where one finds members of Achaean ethnos 
is among the mercenaries of the ten thousand.  Xenophon notes two important facts 
concerning the group.  Achaeans, along with Arcadians, represented over half the total 
army.
45
  Achaea clearly had a surplus of fighting men following the war, and their 
economic situation did not permit these men a decent living at home.  He also notes that 
the Arcadians and Achaeans were quite amenable to one another.
46
  The wider 
implications of this traditional “fellow” feeling might be a willingness for Arcadian states 
                                                             
41
Plutarch, Alcibiades, 15.3, Thucydides 5.52.2. 




Larsen, Greek Federal States (Oxford:1968), 87.  There was one recorded interruption, after the Theban 
invasion of Epaminondas.  It was quickly reversed through the counter-coup of exiled oligarchs, who 
remained staunch Spartan Allies.  Xenophon, Hellenica, 7.1.43. 
45
Xenophon, Anabasis, 7.4.8. 
46
Xenophon, Anabasis, 7.4.8. 
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to work with the Achaean polity.  Though an interesting idea, Achaea would prove a 
thorn in Arcadia’s collective side in the years after the Battle of Leuctra (371 BCE).  
Epaminondas effected democratic revolutions to gain another Peloponnesian ally.  This 
backfired as the formally neutral Achaeans joined the Spartans wholeheartedly, 
presenting pressure to the Arcadians from both the north and south, and creating real 
difficulties according to Xenophon.
47
 
 In 373 BCE, the League suffered a disaster at one of its mera.  A great earthquake 
destroyed the polis of Helice.  Along with the interesting points on the relationship 
between the Ionians and Achaeans, this disaster provides the example of the League in 
action.  A force of two thousand men was dispatched to aid the inhabitants of Helice.  But 
the disaster was too large for them to restore the polis in any way, so the territory and 
surviving residents were absorbed into the neighboring poleis of Aegium and Aegeira.
48
  
The acceptance of nonresidents into the fold of a polis is no small act.  The existence of 
an overarching League and sense of kinship provided the survivors of Helice with a place 
to fulfill the chief imperative of Greek culture, citizenship in a polis.   
Achaea did provide one recorded innovation which stood out among the other 
ethnic confederacies of central and southern Hellas.  After the Peloponnesian War, 
perhaps in an effort to extend their commercial interests, the Achaeans admitted several 
trans-Corinthian Gulf poleis into their League, as Achaeans.  The list of poleis is not 
spelled out in any text, but across different sources one can produce Calydon, Pleuron 
                                                             
47
Xenophon, Hellenica, 7.1.43. 
48
Emily Mackil, “Wandering Cities: Alternatives to Catastrophe in the Greek Polis,” American  
Journal of Archaeology vol. 108, no. (4 Oct., 2004), 511. 
16 
 
and Naupactus as new Achaean constituents.
49
  Explicitly these poleis received Achaean 
citizenship and even federal garrisons to protect them from the nascent Acarnanians.
50
  
This annexation of territory was unique up to this point in Greek history as it conferred an 
ethnic, and federal, designation to nonmembers.
51
   
 One may wonder why both parties chose such a pioneering constitutional 
innovation.  The Achaean interests were more straightforward.  The additional poleis on 
the far side of the Gulf allowed for the increased influence on trade to the western 
Mediterranean from either domestic Achaean sources or rival Corinthian and Sicyonian 
ports.  This had already been attempted from the opposite coast by the Athenians under 
Alcibiades, demonstrating the feasibility of the concept.
52
  The motivations for these 
smaller poleis might appear less obvious, but follow the classic pattern of empire by 
invitation.  Their neighbors, the Acarnanians, had incorporated the Amphilochians to the 
north as well as the polis of Ambracia.   They further seized the other Corinthian 
colonies, Sollium and Anactorium.  Finally, they conquered the polis of Oeniadae closer 
to the Calydon region.
53
  Less than fifteen miles separated Oeniadae from Pleuron, and 
Calydon was a bit further east. 
                                                             
49
Calydon is the most prominent in Xenophon, 4.6.1.  Naupactus must be inferred from the fact that Philip 
II took it from the Achaeans and gave it to the Aetolians in Demosthenes speech IX. 34.  Pleuron is the 
least obvious but the steps are laid out in Klaus Freitag, “Achaea and the Peloponnese,” The Politics of 
Ethnicity and the Crisis of the Peloponnesian League (Cambridge: 2009), 18.  Though generally one finds 
Pleuron paired with Calydon in the sources. 
50
Xenophon, 4.6.1.  Also Diodorus, 15.75.2 who mentions garrisons at Calydon, Naupactus and Dyme(?). 
51
Other contemporary analogues were short lived affairs which fail to bear a favorable comparison, such as 
the sympoliteia between Argos and Corinth, with Argos forcibly extending citizenship to the Corinthians in 
Xenophon, 4.4.6. 
52
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 Acarnania’s conquests had occurred during the Peloponnesian War, in which they 
had served as Athens’ allies.  Calydon and Pleuron receive little coverage but appear to 
be at least favorable to the Spartan side, being the fallback point of Eurylochos after his 
failure to capture Naupactus.
54
  An inlet separated these poleis from Oeniadae, and 
perhaps the Acarnanians were either satisfied with bringing in their last wayward polis, or 
were intimidated by Aetolian power.
55
  But Naupactus had a different enemy.  The 
Athenians had settled a force of former Messenian Helots on that spot, seizing it from the 
Locrians.
56
  The Aetolian League coveted this city, and had been Eurylochos’ principle 
support during his failed attack.  Later they had requested the Spartan King Agesilaus’ 
help during his campaign to assist the new Achaean poleis, Calydon and Pleuron.
57
  After 
the Peloponnesian War, Naupactus was detached from Athenian control and returned to 
the Locrians.
58
  Thus, it too was now in the hands of Spartan allies.  The Aetolians were 
also still interested in annexing Naupactus.  In the wake of Spartan policy on their allies 
government, likely also possessed oligarchic government.  With all three poleis aligned 
along similar foreign policy lines as Achaea, and threatened by leagues who did not offer 
new members equal rights, their motivation to join with the Achaeans becomes clear and 
sensible.    
 The details of these first nonethnic additions are impossible to determine 
presently, but one fact stands out.  Naupactus, despite being described as freed from a 
federal garrison in the year 367, remained an Achaean polis down until Philip II granted 
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it to the Aetolian League several decades later.
59
  The Achaean League did not have the 
power to compel wayward trans-gulf poleis back into the fold, particularly while the 
power that “freed” them, Thebes, was still ascendant.  Naupactus must have felt its 
interests rested best within the Achaean League system.  Certainly it may have been the 
impulse to side with the least threatening external power,
60
 but Naupactus’ decision 
demonstrates the appeal that the political dynamic within the League held for both 
ethnically and nonethnically Achaean members. 
 A united Achaea, restricted to the original region, lasted until the reign of the 
Macedonian king, Alexander the Great (336-323 BCE).  Polybius attests to the disunion 
that befell the members, likely stemming from the same reasons the League teetered 
during the Peloponnesian War.  With the Peloponnese a battlefield, the individual 
Achaean poleis would have suffered at the caprice of Hellenistic monarchs, and no 
amount of unity could have prevented it.  The one concrete example of Macedonian 
interference was the imposition of the tyrant Chaeron on his home polis of Pellene during 
the reign of Alexander.
61
  As the easternmost polis and somewhat cut off from the rest of 
Achaea, it makes sense that Pellene would be affected so early.  Polybius makes the plain 
distinction that Cassander and Demetrius Poliorcetes established garrisons, exercising 
direct control, while Antigonus Gonatas, perhaps in poorer circumstances, supported 
local tyrants.
62
  In the end, most Achaean poleis had garrisons or foreign tyrants down to 
280 BCE, with the important exception of a few western poleis.   
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Reforming the League 
The Achaean League reformed during the 124
th
 Olympiad when four of the 
remaining ten ethnically Achaean poleis chose to reestablish their association.
63
  
However, the unity of Patrae, Dyme, Tritaea and Pharae was insufficient for those 
Achaean residents.  This project of reformation had an explicitly expansionist theme.  
Polybius’ mention that no records were kept due to the identity of the four cities64 makes 
no sense unless one understands that they aimed at the recapture of Aegium, the 
traditional repository of League records.  Those four poleis would not stop until they had 
“freed” and united with the other six.65   
The project was strictly traditional in its outlook.  All Achaean settlements would 
be united as they had been.  This policy was, in all probability, popular with the majority 
of ethnic Achaeans, making its execution somewhat straightforward.  The main 
impediments were an explicitly mentioned Macedonian garrison at Aegium, perhaps 
another at Bura, and the tyrants at the remaining poleis.
66
  Expansion proceeded from 
west to east with much internal help.  An interesting role was played by Margos, who 
either was or became the leading citizen of the League before Aratus.  Polybius reports 
his central role in the death of the tyrant of Bura, and the fear this act engendered within 
the neighboring tyrant of Karyneia, Iseas.
67
  Karyneia was also purportedly the home of 
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  This suggests that an Achaean exile community existed which quickly allied 
with, or perhaps helped to begin, the reformation of the League. 
Polybius recounts this early history of Achaea only briefly.  The strategies of 
unity and unification are somewhat difficult to see, but a single tactic is clearly evident.  
The Achaeans, probably led by Margos, targeted the tyrants of the remaining poleis, 
specifically killing the tyrant of Bura.  The tyrant of Karyneia, Iseas, handed over his 
polis after a promise of personal safety.
69
  The pressure of the state was brought to bear 
upon the ruling elite, and the Achaeans promised safety in return for their objectives.  In 
the tyrant filled world of Achaea specifically, and the Peloponnese generally, this strategy 
worked well.  The populations of these poleis probably welcomed reunification, and only 
the Tyrants prevented this process from occurring.  Within a decade the Achaeans had 
reformed their League.  Aratus of Sicyon aggressively continued this strategy of targeting 
individuals of power to achieve his own, and his League’s, aims. 
The Achaean polity was reconstituted with a somewhat archaic governing 
executive.  Two strategoi, or generals, led the executive, with an additional officer called 
a grammateus koinos, or League secretary, selected in rotation among the member 
states.
70
  This practice reflected fourth century Hellenic federal custom,
71
 and conformed 
to the idea that the renewed Achaean League was deeply traditional in its original 
outlook.  It also represented an archaic strategy of unity which was soon to be abandoned.  
Offering equal leadership access to each of the ten Achaean constituents through a 
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rotation gave each a chance for position and status every few years.  But with Achaean 
strategy so deeply focused on elites, the system was bound to change in light of 
contemporary circumstances and practice. 
Polybius notes that twenty-five years after the refounding of the League, the 
executive positions were altered with a single general, strategos autokrator, to lead 
League affairs.
72
  Margos of Karyneia won the position at its inception.  The change 
reflected new contemporary practice.  The most prominent Hellenistic federation, the 
Aetolian League, had a clear hierarchy of offices, with its strategos, hipparchos (cavalry 
commander/vice chief) and a grammateus.
73
     This shift in League policy had 
unexpected and positive future results.  The ability of any League citizen to stand for the 
single highest office provided a carrot to prominent politicians among non-League 
members in addition to the stick of threatened assassination.  Internally it also provided 
the space for a single dominant politician, such as Margos and later, Aratus, to directly 
influence policy more often, and without a colleague.  Consecutive terms were not 
permitted, but supreme office every other year was more tempting to the ambitious than 
shared office every four or five years.   
Margos of Karyneia is nowhere attested using this new carrot.  From what is 
reported, he followed a very traditional foreign policy.  His involvement in the 
reconstitution of the League has been noted.  In a number of other regards, however, the 
Achaeans acted in a manner reminiscent of their fourth century forbearers.  The two 
mainstays of Hellenic Achaean politics were an interest in influencing Corinthian gulf 
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trade and an alliance with Sparta to aid in that effort.
74
  Under the leadership of Margos,
75
 
the Achaeans supported the Spartans in Areus I’s coalition against the Macedonians.76  
When this alliance collapsed, overmatched by Macedonian power, the Achaeans 
eventually turned north.  An alliance was struck with the Aetolians from across the Gulf, 
which Margos supported until his death in their only recorded joint mission, the relief of 
the Corcyrans (329 BCE).
77
   
Turning back to the campaign of Areus I, the Chremonidean War remains the one 
foreign policy choice in which the pre-Aratan League is recorded to have participated.  
The war principally involved King Ptolemy II Philadelphus, Athens, Sparta and her allies 
on the one hand, and Macedonia and her allies on the other.  The composition of Sparta’s 
allies reflects the closest one comes to the natural foreign policy orientations of the 
Peloponnese.  Allied to Sparta were: Achaea, Elis, the Arcadian poleis of Tegea, 
Mantinea, Orchomenus, Caphya and Phigalia.
78
  This list represents those states which 
were furthest away from Sparta, and hence, felt least threatened by Spartan power, as 
well as those Arcadian poleis which had reason to mistrust Sparta but despised their 
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western neighbor, Megalopolis, more.
79
  Excluded from this list are traditional Spartan 
enemies: Messene, Megalopolis, the Argolid poleis as well as Corinth.  Jumping ahead, 
the Achaean League would integrate all of these states except for Messene during its 
early phase of expansion.  The Corinthians were not necessarily anti-Spartan, but the 
Macedonian garrison on the Acrocorinth certainly was.  This fetter of Greece merited its 
appellation, for the Macedonian garrison blocked Areus I from relieving the siege at 
Athens.  Thwarted in his first attempt and overwhelmed in his second, Areus I found 
Antigonus’ defensive system all too effective.80   
Achaean involvement in this war demonstrated the continued significance of 
regional rivalries in the loosely controlled Peloponnese.  The conflict also reinforced the 
reality that the international situation had fundamentally changed.  Foreign policy could 
not leave out the resources of the Hellenistic monarchies.  While supporting an old ally, 
Sparta, the Achaeans asserted their continued hostility to the Macedonian king, and hence 
their goodwill toward Ptolemy II.  The war confirmed yet again that success was only 
possible through the financial and military support of one of the great monarchies.   
Though ancient historians covered political developments with greater zeal, 
religious practice played a more central role in the lives of most citizens, even the elite 
leaders of the League.  Therefore, it would be a mistake to neglect the Achaean federal 
sanctuary.  During this period, as Polybius had laid out in his coverage of the original 
League, the heart of cooperation and prime site of organization was the sanctuary of Zeus 
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  Religious sanctuaries served as the focal point of communal action, even 
after a Hellenic league had evolved beyond rudimentary organization and into well-
functioning governments.
82
  By the time of the Cleomenean War, much of the 
bureaucratic and political functions had moved to Aegium, on whose territory the 
Homarion sat.
83
  Yet from contemporary analogues one must assume that important and 
unifying religious rituals were still going at the precinct of Zeus Homarius. 
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In many ways the renewed Achaean League resembled its fourth century self, 
with the addition of the almost default anti-Macedonian foreign policy.  But the 
aggressive targeting of antagonistic tyrants, developed during the earlier period, became a 
mainstay of Achaean political strategy.  With the admission of Sicyon as a full member 
of the federation in 251 BCE, the League took on a new expansionist program which 
ceased to consider only ethnic affiliation.  Under the new leadership of Aratus of Sicyon, 
the Achaeans
84
 relentlessly pressured their neighbors into joining the League on the same 
terms as Sicyon.  This shift in priorities was not instantaneous.  It took a few years for 
Aratus to climb to the pinnacle of League politics, though once established he remained 
there until his death in 213 BCE.  It bears mentioning that the greater source material for 
this period allows for more depth in the examination of the situation of the League.  
 
Aratus of Sicyon 
In 251 BCE, Aratus, then an exile in Argos, launched a surprise attack upon his 
home city of Sicyon.  He deposed the tyrant Nicocles and made himself master of the 
                                                             
84





   Despite the vehement praise of Aratus as a paragon of democratic values,
86
 
Aratus replaced one tyrant with another, himself.
87
  Plutarch portrays all of his decisions 
as his alone, with no need to convince a local assembly or boule.
88
  Given the recent 
history of Sicyon, Aratus was only groundbreaking in his longevity.  Nicocles was one of 
a long list of Sicyonian tyrants, a list which included Aratus’ father, Cleinias.89  Though 
not reported as such, Aratus may even have been Antigonus Gonatas’ preferred tyrant. 
As Aratus proved such a lodestone to the League, it is profitable to discuss briefly 
his polis of origin.  The polis of Sicyon sat west of Corinth a few miles down the coast.  
Further west, Sicyon bordered the Achaean polis of Pellene, with the natural boundary 
traditionally the river Sythas.
90
  The plain of Sicyonia was famous throughout the Greek 
world for its wealth, and supported a prosperous community.
91
  At some point during the 
Archaic period, Sicyon fought a war against the Achaeans, with some success.
92
  The 
artistic traditions of Sicyon were legendary, but bear relevance on the political situation 
in only one direct case during the Hellenistic period.   
During the Classical period, Sicyon allied itself with Sparta, being a much more 
consistent and loyal ally than other poleis in that region.  Sicyon demonstrated its relative 
strength in the general defense of Hellas against the Persians.  Sicyonian triremes fought 
at Artemisium and Salamis, and three thousand hoplites, quite a large number, fought at 
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  Sicyonians were also quite active in the Peloponnesian War, supplying ships 
and troops to the allied effort in the Corinthian gulf and possibly with Brasidas’ 
expedition into northern Greece.
94
  Similar to the case of the Achaeans, Sparta, with the 
aid of one thousand armed Argive aristocrats, strengthened the oligarchy in Sicyon.
95
  
This strengthened tie paid dividends as Sicyon remained loyal during the Corinthian War.  
Sicyon served as the main base of Spartan operations during the Corinthian War.  One 
gets a glimpse of Sicyon’s standing among the armed combatants during this war.  
Though a useful ally and possessing a strategic location, an Argive force gladly attacked 
what they thought was a Sicyonian contingent.
96
  Clearly their neighbors had a low 
opinion of Sicyonian andreia.   
 Sicyon’s ethnic status was Dorian, but there was some important ambiguity 
which certain Sicyonians developed.  The polis was subdivided into a number of phyle, or 
tribes.  Three of these were the typical Dorian phyle, and in Sicyon, as in many Dorian 
poleis, there was a fourth, non-Dorian tribe.  In the Archaic period there arose the tyrant 
Cleisthenes, grandfather to the better known Athenian reformer.  Amongst many anti-
Argive reforms and policies, he declared the Dorian tribes renamed to the derogatory 
Donkeymen, Goatmen and Swinemen.  For his own non-Dorian tribe he gave the name of 
Archelaoi, “the ruling people.”97   
After his death, Cleisthenes’ opponents had the names changed back, but renamed 
the Archelaoi the “Aegialeis,” the same as the former mythic name of the region of 
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  The official mythic tradition stresses that pre-Dorian peoples in this area were 
the Achaeans from Homer, the same group from whom the contemporary Achaeans 
claimed descent.  The reasons for choosing the name Aegialeis may have been different 
at the time.  The eponymous hero, Aegialos, was the son of Adrastos, King of Argos and 
hence, represented a rapprochement to that polis.
99
  But the creation or reinforcement of 




In the aftermath of Macedonian subjugation of Greece, Hellenistic monarchs 
generally paired Sicyon with Corinth in strategic terms.  The cities lay on the key land 
route from the Peloponnesus to central Greece.  The tumultuous times laid a heavy hand 
upon Sicyon.  The city was captured and lost as different Macedonian dynasts rose and 
fell.
101
  The last recorded seizure wrought a harrowing change on the inhabitants.  
Demetrius Poliorcetes, after his surprise attack succeeded, determined that the city was 
poorly placed.  He moved the entire population onto the acropolis and destroyed the 
nonsanctioned portions of the old city.  Adding insult to life altering destruction, he 
renamed the city Demetrias.
102
  It may be due to this dislocation, after the decade of 
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The sources fall silent after this traumatic event, but over the next few decades 
direct Macedonian control ebbed, and tyrants filled the power vacuum.
104
  This stands in 
contrast to Corinth, which was the more important of the two sites.  At its new location, 
the city was more secure from foreign threat, but experienced numerous internal 
upheavals as the remaining elites sorted out who would lead the city.  An unnamed series 
of tyrants ended in the death of a named one, Cleon.
105
  The people set up the 
“magistrate” Cleinias, Aratus’ father, who was in turn assassinated by Abantiades.106  His 
death during the middle of the Chremonidean War, in which Sicyon did not participate, 
either suggests how preoccupied Sicyon was with internal affairs, or an effective and cost 
effective strategy the Macedonians maintained to keep the Hellenic poleis divided and 
distracted. 
Within this volatile context, the brief narration of their fall from power casts 
doubt on Plutarch’s description of Cleinias as a chief magistrate along with a certain 
Timocleides.  These two were the only men described as anything but a tyrant or 
demagogue.
107
  However, their fall is attributed to Timocleides’ death and the 
assassination of Cleinias by an aspiring tyrant, Abantiadas.  Cleinias and Abantiadas were 
in fact brothers-in-law.  This indicates Cleinias’ inclusion in the small clique from which 
the tyrants rose.
108
  Further, he held guest-friendship and hospitality with the Macedonian 
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King, Antigonus II Gonatas.
109
  Finally, Timocleides’ natural death prompted the collapse 
of their government.  This hints at the personal nature of their power, as opposed to 
officeholders whose authority rests in the position they inhabit.  Only the deference to the 
historically great Aratus granted his father immunity from the charge of tyranny. 
Aratus sought to regain the power lost by his father.  Failing to get royal 
patronage, Aratus launched his assault with the support of the Sicyonian exile 
community, mercenaries and thirty members of his household.  His relationship to the 
great Hellenistic monarchies was ambivalent.  Though possessing a friendship tie to the 
Antigonids, the Ptolemaic court sent Aratus twenty five talents soon after his coup.
110
  
Plutarch reports that Aratus was wary of Antigonus Gonatas’ interference on account of 
that monarch’s opposition to freedom. 111  This statement may be a somewhat truthful 
rendering of the young Aratus’ geo-political concerns, or it may be an anachronistic 
insertion.  Whatever Aratus’ exact standing in the eyes of the Antigonid court, Plutarch 
acknowledges fear of Antigonus along with internal dissensions as leading to Aratus’ 
decision to apply for admission to the Achaean League.
112
 
The months directly after Aratus’ coup did not see him immediately offer his 
polis to the Achaean League.  For a time, Aratus attempted to gain Antigonid support 
again.  Though spurned while he was yet an exile in Argos, as master of Sicyon, Aratus 
had something to offer Antigonus Gonatas.  The jewel in the fetters of Greece, the 
Acrocorinth, had recently fallen out of the Antigonid orbit.  Seduced by Ptolemaic 
wealth, Alexander, governor of Corinth, proclaimed himself an independent king in 252 
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  Macedonian influence in the Peloponnese was thus greatly reduced just as 
Aratus seized Sicyon.  Aratus clearly offered to raid Alexander on Antigonus’ behalf.114  
This offer was the natural course for Aratus to take, and probably involved a deal for 
subsidies to steady Aratus’ new regime.  He desperately needed funds to reconcile the 
recently returned exiles.
115
  Antigonus’ support must have fallen short of expectations, as 
Aratus fatefully chose a different source of succor within less than a year. 
There is no record of the process, or debate, of Sicyon’s admission into the 
League.  The Achaean reasons for admitting Sicyon remain obscure.  The addition of a 
comparably powerful city may be motivation enough, and the ethnic and traditional 
hurtles may not have been too high.
116
  Certainly the trauma Sicyon had experienced 
would open its citizens to new fundamental arrangements of the political order.  With the 
whole city moved, including the probable abandonment of cults tied to specific places 
and the dislocation of family holdings, the timing was most propitious to put forward 
some bold new plan.  The moment was further supported by an alternative mythic 
tradition which Aratus could hold out as a return to a true Archaic state of affairs, at least 
for a significant portion of the citizen body. 
Plutarch lists political and idealistic considerations for Aratus, which may be 
accurate, but a further conjecture into his reasoning may be hypothesized.  Aratus 
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required an outside military force to secure his legitimacy and prop up his regime.
117
  In 
252 BCE, Antigonus Gonatas was distant and weak, and Aratus had antagonized the new 
king of Corinth.  His neighbors, Achaea and large parts of Arcadia were unfriendly, if not 
openly hostile, to Macedonian interests.  Aratus turned from the normal source of 
military assistance and instead chose to accept it from his Achaean neighbors.  One 
possible example of this military help may be the extraordinary authority Aratus was 
given during the height of the Cleomenean War, though during the strategia of his 
supporter Timoxenus.  Using federal troops, Aratus purged Sicyon of all untrustworthy 
citizens through summary executions.
118
  At that time, he held no official office.  After he 
had dealt with the Sicyonian traitors and failed to do the same in Corinth, he was 
officially invested with absolute authority.
119
  Though this was a much later action, its 
occurrence lends weight to the notion that Aratus viewed this as a tool to maintain his 
power. The Achaean League could function in the place of Macedonian power. 
The addition of Sicyon in 251 BCE augmented the strength of Achaea, but not the 
overall strategic position.  The Achaean League remained confined to the southern shore 
of the Corinthian Gulf.  The Aetolian League across the gulf was at that time a powerful 
neighbor, which at that moment was malevolently ambiguous, but it would soon move 
closer to alliance.  Aetolia had strong alliances, particularly with Elis, but also 
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  They also occupied under direct control, the town of Phigalea just to the 
south of Elis, from which their raiders found safe haven while on the frequent Aetolian 
piratical forays.
121
  Arcadia was a patchwork, with many independent states and with 
many poleis friendly to Macedonia.  To the east, Corinth stood as one of the fetters of 
Greece, garrisoned by the friendly, but ambitious, Alexander.  Argos and its 
dependencies stood further southeast, all reliant on Macedonia.  Aside from a warming 
relationship with Aetolia, which bore fruit with a formal alliance in 238 BCE, Achaea 
allied itself with Sparta.
122
   
Sicyon’s admittance into the League did not alter its own stature by much in the 
years immediately following.  Aratus, though master of his own polis, took a few years 
before gaining his first strategia.
123
  Margos, or other ethnically Achaean statesmen, still 
held the reins of power.  Paying his dues, Aratus served in the federal cavalry, which 
befitted a man of his station.  To whatever service Plutarch is referring, it was not the 
position of hipparchos, since he cultivated the reputation of obedience to proper 
authority.
124
  His only other noted service before reaching the supreme federal office was 
the procurement of funds from Ptolemy.
125
  Though mainly directed to his own city, one 
may speculate on the influence these Ptolemaic talents had on his subsequent election to 
the strategia.   
                                                             
120
Polybius, 4.9.9 on the alliance with Elis, Walbank, Commentary, 458.  There is a long tradition, 
beginning with Herodotus, 8.73, that the people of Elis are Aetolians, and that an alliance of consanguinity 
exists between them historically.  Polybius 4.6.9 on the alliance with Messenia, Walbank, Commentary, 
455. 
121
Polybius, 4.31.1, Walbank, Commentary, 477. 
122
Pausanias records some conflict between the Achaeans and Sparta under Agis IV, but only after Aratus 
had become strategos. 
123
Joining the League while he was about twenty, he may not have met an undocumented age requirement 
for the highest posts, Walbank, Aratos, 39. 
124
Plutarch, Aratus, 11.1. 
125
Plutarch, Aratus, 11.2-13.4 for the whole adventure.  
34 
 
The ascendency of Aratus led to new foreign policy ideas.  Aratus directed a 
series of actions which were directed primarily against the interests of Aetolia.  His first 
strategia was marked by three military operations: raids against Aetolia and West Locris, 
an Aetolian dependency, the failed march to aid the Boeotians in their war against 
Aetolia, and the failed attack on the Arcadian polis of Cynaetha.
126
  The timing of these 
events is difficult to establish, but logically they took place in the same year and they all 
point to Aratus’ anti-Aetolian strategy.  The raids on Calydon and Locris may have been 
simple retaliation or provocation.  The Cynaetha operation was certainly aggressive, but 
likely had a defensive aspect. 
Cynaetha rests along the watershed between Achaea and Arcadia, just on the 
Achaean side.  Its position controlled one of the routes into Achaea available to Aetolia 
through their allies, the Eleans.
127
  This route had only just opened.  Lydiades, newly 
raised to the tyranny in Megalopolis, had surrendered the Arcadian poleis of Alipheira 
and Psophis to Elis.
128
  With so much Arcadian territory in Elean hands, Aetolia had the 
capacity to raid nearly any point within the Achaean League.  Though only a few years 
away, the alliance between Aetolia and Achaea was not yet born.  Aetolian raids had 
clearly become a real nuisance.  Aratus sought to close this route into central and eastern 
Achaea.  He again demonstrated the penchant for encouraging betrayal and surprise 
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attacks which had won him Sicyon and would gain the Achaeans many other 
strongpoints.  Though the attack failed, it signaled an assertive League. 
The expedition into Boeotia heralded a cunning and dangerous League.  
According to Polybius, the Achaeans had instigated the war in the first place.
129
 Just as at 
Cynaetha, the plan ultimately failed on account of the tardiness of Achaean forces.  But 
those forces marched, 10,000 strong, to a region close, but not adjacent, to Achaea. Their 
intentions were to blunt the growth of a stronger power, again, Aetolia.
130
  From the 
passive ally of the Spartans in the 260s, the Achaean League had emerged as a force to be 
reckoned, if not greatly feared.   
 
Expansion 
For eight years, events fared not much differently from the preceding decades, 
until Aratus’ second strategia when he captured the Acrocorinth.  As historians 
recognize, this was his great accomplishment. After this event the power structure of the 
Peloponnese fundamentally changed.  Macedonian influence was dealt a severe blow.  A 
grateful Corinth chose to join the Achaean League, following the example of Sicyon.  A 
garrison remained on the Acrocorinth, however, this time of Achaean rather than 
Macedonian origin.  The changing of the flag on this fetter of Greece represented the new 
order within the Peloponnese. 
The presence of an Achaean garrison on the Acrocorinth signaled the hegemonic 
intent of the Achaean League.  Four hundred Achaean, not Corinthian, hoplites guarded 
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the Acrocorinth, with fifty dogs and their trainers.
131
  Polybius attributes high ideals, such 
as opposition to tyrants and Macedonians as well as the love of liberty, to his hero’s 
actions.
132
  But this action demonstrates Aratus sought not to create a new political order, 
but a new military one.  He made the world safe for anti-Macedonian tyrants, not 
democracy.  The Corinthians would have as little access to their strategic acropolis under 
the Achaeans as they did under the Macedonians.  When they attempted to exercise some 
autonomy, Aratus tried to have his opponents purged, but failing that, held the 
Acrocorinth against the people of Corinth at all costs.
133
   
Achaean success at Corinth brought further gains.  Megara, Epidaurus and 
Troezen, Dorian cities all, followed the decision of Corinth.
134
  Aratus saw the next 
logical target as Argos. His opponent was Aristomachus, the tyrant who had sheltered 
him when he was a boy.
135
  Coldly calculating the best way to power in Argos was the 
death of his former benefactor, Aratus arranged for his assassination.  The assassins fell 
out over petty issues, but some slaves killed Aristomachus in any event.
 136
  Aratus rushed 
Argos with all available Achaean forces when he heard the news, only to find that 
Aristippus had seized the tyranny.
137
  Fined for attacking a neighbor in peacetime, Aratus 
came to grips with his new opponent. 
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After this, Aratus attacked that city on a number of occasions, always receiving a 
rebuff, though sometimes carrying away a lesser prize.  After one failed invasion, Aratus 
detached Cleonae from Argive control.
138
  Making full use of the new League member, 
Aratus had the people of Cleonae hold the Nemean games as a counter to the games at 
Argos, and he proceeded unscrupulously to seize all athletes traveling to the wrong 
(Argive) games.
139
  While he never won a spectacular victory, Aratus kept the pressure 
up on his neighbors, particularly those closely allied with Macedonia.  These action 
eroded confidence in the protection of the Macedonian King Antigonus Gonatas, who did 
little to reassert his own power. 
While Macedonian power receded, other Hellenic powers contended with the 
Achaeans.  During a large plundering expedition which was the pillar of their social 
structure,
140
 the Aetolians marched through the Isthmus of Corinth in to Achaean 
territory.  In a demonstration of his avoidance of pitched battles, Aratus declined to 
engage the Aetolians at the border of the League, then in the territory of Megara.  This 
was despite the assistance of the Spartan army under the command of King Agis IV.
141
  
This Aetolian force skirted around the Acrocorinth and Sicyon, turning to sack Pellene.  
Aratus had by this point dismissed his allies, and even some Achaean forces.  But with 
his remaining troops he fell upon and routed the Aetolians, who had become disorganized 
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  Two years later Aratus took credit for the formation of an alliance 
with these Aetolians through their leader, Pantaleon, though there is reason to link 
Margos of Karyneia to this development.
143
 
In this action Aratus was in most typical form.  Avoiding open battle, Aratus 
defeated his opponents through an attack from unexpected quarters and at an unexpected 
time.  He received heavy criticism for his initial decision, only to reap the praise of his 
eventual success.
144
  But in his dismissal of his Spartan ally he also showed himself true 
to form.  Aratus would suffer no equal, and certainly no rival in power and glory, so long 
as he had the ability to stop it.  Engaging in an operation in which Aratus was self-
consciously deficient, with the aid of another army which was proficient, would naturally 
lead to the credit falling to that other army.  This pattern would repeat itself as other 
powerful poleis joined the Achaean League, and Aratus found himself with more 
permanent rivals for authority and power. 
In addition to Argos, Athens was another polis which continually felt the pressure 
of Aratus’ Achaeans.  Placed under a Macedonian garrison since the Chremonidean War, 
Athens seemed to conform to the typical target of Achaean “liberation.”  The polis of 
Megara had joined the Achaean League, offering them a border with Attica.
145
  In tandem 
with his attacks on Argos, Aratus began raiding the Athenian port of Piraeus, the location 
of the main Macedonian garrison on the hill of Munchia.  He attacked not twice, or 
thrice, but many times.
146
  What the specific appeal of Athens was to Aratus is not 
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attested, but either for the prestige of this famous polis or some other reason, Aratus 
attacked Athens with perhaps more frequency than Argos.  Just as at Argos after the 
death of Aristomachus, Aratus attacked Athens without provocation and gained notoriety 
for his breach of the peace.
147
Aratus is noted as stepping up his attacks after the death of 
Antigonus Gonatas.
148
  But his efforts would go to naught for another ten years until the 
death of Gonatas’ son and successor, Demetrius II.  Only then, would the garrison 
commander, Diogenes, accept a large bribe to discharge his mercenaries and leave, with 
twenty talents contributed directly from Aratus.
149
   
In this act Aratus conformed to his usual strategy.  He directly targeted the single 
most powerful individual in Athens.  But once Diogenes, who was not a local leader but a 
foreigner, relinquished his power, the state of Athens did not opt to join the Achaean 
League.  One might note the proud independent tradition of the Athenians to explain their 
glad use of Achaean help to eject the Macedonians, followed by their refusal to join the 
League.  But certainly other poleis that had joined to that point possessed similarly proud 
traditions of autonomy.  The central impediment was the Athenian democratic 
government.
150
  Less susceptible to the pressures Aratus brought to bear, Athenian 
statesmen did not see the benefit in joining the Achaean League.  However, some benefits 
did rebound to the Achaean cause for all of Aratus’ efforts.  Hermione, as well as the 
island of Aegina, joined the League in the aftermath of Athens’ independence.151  The 
government of Aegina is uncertain, but Polybius states that Hermione was turned over by 
                                                             
147
Plutarch, Aratus, 33.2. 
148
Plutarch, Aratus, 34.1. 
149
Plutarch, Aratus, 34.4. 
150
As always, the term democratic does not imply the kind of radical democracy Athens practiced in the 
fifth century, but rather as the antonym to the tyrannical or monarchical governments then prevalent 
throughout the Greek world.   
151





  Aratan tactics succeeded again on the group which they most 
effectively targeted, tyrants. 
This policy continued to bear fruit further afield.  Though obscured by the focus 
on Argos, the Achaean League clearly continued to have an interest in Arcadia.  Seeing 
the intense pressure on Argos, Lydiades, tyrant of Megalopolis, voluntarily handed his 
city over to the League.  The aggressive foreign policy of the League most certainly 
influenced this decision.  In addition to the hounding of the Argive tyrants, Lydiades was 
further frightened by the success of Achaean arms in the nearby polis of Heraea.
153
  The 
conquest of this polis, fairly deep in Arcadia, suggests that the Achaeans had matched 
their eastward march with one to the southwest.  Attacks in this direction may have taken 
place during Aratus’ off year, 154 as the strategos in that action is recorded as Diaetas.  
This may also represent the divergent priorities held within the Achaean leadership. 
Aratus focused on the east, the natural orientation of a Sicyonian, while another faction, 
still supportive of the successful Aratan program, looked into Arcadia. 
Seeing the storm on the horizon, Lydiades searched for a way out.  He was 
perhaps inspired by the example of Iseas and Margos.  Negotiations may have occurred, 
stressing the power and prestige of joining the League.  Whether promises were made, or 
not, Lydiades resigned his tyranny and joined his polis to the League.
155
  This completed, 
he was elected strategos autokrator on Aratus’ off years.  This event, much as the capture 
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of the Acrocorinth, ushered in a further large addition of territory.  All Arcadian 
dependencies of Megalopolis naturally followed suit.   
Finally, Argos joined the League under the aegis of Aristomachus, son of the by 
then deceased Aristippus.
156
  With Argos came Phlius, making the whole of the Argolid 
region united within the Achaean League. This represented a feat not accomplished by a 
native Peloponnesian political entity since perhaps the Bronze Age.  Polybius ties this 
accomplishment to the death of Demetrius II, whose successor, Philip V, was still a 
minor.  Plutarch relates that Aratus communicated directly with Aristomachus, offering 
Lydiades as a positive model, bringing up both the benefits which accrued to the League 
and to the person.  Then, in a questionable narrative, Lydiades attempts to bypass Aratus 
and claim the credit for himself.  Aratus then publically denounces the proposal, only to 
back it once more after it has gone down in defeat under Lydiades’ leadership.  Finally, in 
the year 229, during the strategia of Lydiades, Aristomachus agreed to hand over his city 
in exchange for 50 talents to pay off his mercenaries.  This proposal was ratified by the 
Achaean council
157
 and both Argos and Phlius joined the League.
158
  Just as in the case of 
Lydiades, Aristomachus was elected strategos in the following year.
159
 
The pattern of Aratan strategy finds itself fully reported in the ancient sources for 
Argos.  Aratus had at first violently targeted this tyranny.  He was certainly responsible 
for the death of one tyrant and possibly a second.  He attempted several surprise attacks 
to seize the city as he had seized Sicyon, Corinth, Cleonae and other poleis.  This 
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matched his known desire to personally secure the addition of a new Achaean member all 
on his own terms.  When this failed, he, at long last, consented to a diplomatic approach 
directly to the new tyrant of Argos.  When a rival threatened to steal, or at least share the 
glory, Aratus took steps to make the deal all his own.  In fact, Lydiades may have 
initiated the negotiations in the first place.
160
  Aratus certainly had good reasons to 
position himself as the originator of the scheme which finally incorporated Argos in the 
Achaean League.  In any event, the negotiations targeted Aristomachus specifically and it 
was on his authority as tyrant that the storied polis of Argos, with its tradition of proud 
autonomy going back to Homer, joined the League. 
The addition of Argos brought the League to its widest extent through the force of 
its independent arms.  The Achaeans continued to push outward, however, up until the 
disastrous losses during the Cleomenean War.  As the conflict with Sparta heated up, one 
finds references to raids and attacks upon the territory of Elis.
161
  This gives a clue to one 
of the more intriguing developments during the run up to the war.  Just prior to the 
commencement of the conflict, Cleomenes acquired the Arcadian poleis of Tegea, 
Mantinea and Orchomenos.  As the major cities of eastern Arcadia, this enhanced 
Sparta’s power considerably, as well as allowing for a stronger strategic position against 
the Achaean League.  Formally these poleis had a close association with the Aetolians, 
which Polybius claims was membership in the Aetolian League.  Polybius further 
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attributes Aetolian duplicity to the annexation, claiming that the transfer received their 
approval.
162
   
The Achaean League, Aetolia and Sparta were the chief anti-Macedonian powers 
in mainland Greece.  Their relationship was far from straightforward.  Though their 
stances regarding the great Hellenistic monarchies were essentially the same, the growth 
of the Achaean League had profoundly changed the local dynamics for the two older 
powers.  For the Spartans, their old ally and dependent began to rival them in influence 
and prestige.  This situation, though unpleasant, was still tolerable while the Macedonians 
maintained some control in the Peloponnese.  The Aetolians chose to enlist the nascent 
League in their greater struggle against the Macedonians.  The alliance of 239 BCE 
profited both Leagues, though they rarely cooperated directly.  At the death of Demetrius 
II, this alliance was triumphant.  But in short order, his successor, Antigonus III Doson, 
successfully pushed back the Aetolians and left them vulnerable at every point in which 
they held influence.
163
   
Aetolian weakness provided the impetus for fresh aggression in the Peloponnesus.  
It began with Cleomenes III’s seizure of the western Arcadian poleis.  Aetolia’s 
connivance cannot be ruled out; distant, exposed poleis might be better utilized through 
balancing competing powers.  But perhaps more likely it was simple preoccupation.  The 
timing of the annexation certainly points to Spartan opportunism.
164
  Regardless, the 
Achaeans may have perceived Aetolian collusion and altered their stance in return.  It is 
in this light that one should consider the Achaean raid on Elis. 
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As it would continue to be, Elis was at this time a close ally of Aetolia. Aetolia 
was still the nominal ally of the Achaean League.  Plutarch records the desire on the part 
of Aratus to unite the whole of the Peloponnese into the League, although this opinion 
possibly derives from his pro-Spartan source, Phylarchus.
165
  This desire does, however, 
correspond to ideas in Polybius.
166
  Whether anachronistic or true, Achaean aggression 
toward Elis certainly matched their former aggressive conduct.  This direct provocation 
of an Aetolian ally was not met with outright war.  Just as Sparta seized eastern Arcadia 
with impunity, Achaea molested Elis with resistance only coming from Sparta.
167
   
The decision to break with Aetolia through attacks upon its primary 
Peloponnesian ally must have come from Aratus.  As mentioned before, the only 
recorded joint operation between the two great Hellenistic leagues resulted in failure and 
the death of the likely commander of that expedition, Margos of Karyneia.
168
  As the 
probable leading voice in favor of the Aetolian alliance, his death freed Aratus from 
strong domestic criticism of his larger Peloponnesian focus.  In his political prime and 
elated with recent successes, Aratus would naturally continue to pressure neighbors even 
if it were not part of a fully conceived plan to unite the Peloponnese.  An opportunist as 
most successful political leaders are, Aratus continued his policies of aggressive pressure 
upon neighboring states. 
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Macedonian influence had waned, and though they had made attempts to 
reestablish their position, they failed without the solid base the Acrocorinth offered.
169
  
The Achaeans had usurped their position within the Peloponnesus.  If a state, particularly 
one ruled by a tyrant, wished peace in the peninsula, then it had to make arrangements 
with the Achaeans.  The states which remained outside the bounds of the Achaean 
League were those which had remained largely beyond Macedonian control and free 
from tyrants: Elis, Messene and Sparta.
170
  As counterintuitive as it is to the Polybian 
description of a League bounded in equality and democracy,
171
 the Achaeans found their 
success in manipulating and perpetuating the system which the Macedonians had created. 
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MEANS OF ACHAEAN UNITY 
 
Federal Institutions under Aratus 
The renewed Achaean League stood at the height of its independent power and 
reputation in the summer of 228 with its new strategos autokrator, Aristomachus of 
Argos.  The institutions which had brought them to this place were: the army, federal 
office, an egalitarian political model which included equal political, legal and economic 
rights as well as the binding agents of a common League ideology and common cult.  
These were imperfect instruments of unity, but they had cobbled together many disparate 
poleis within the fractious Peloponnesus under the banner of the Achaeans. 
The League’s main coercive tool was, far and away, its military.  The federal levy 
was composed of the individual levies of its various constituents.  Just as in classical 
Greece, the central expression of civic virtue was service within the levy.  At this 
moment in the narrative, Achaean forces have had numerous successes, mainly derived 
through the clever stratagems of their commanders such as Aratus, or Diaetas.
172
  There 
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was a garrison at the Acrocorinth at least, if not in other sites.
173
  The Achaeans made use 
of mercenaries, but specifics are difficult to come by at this early stage.  The League 
would later codify a certain number of standing infantry and cavalry mercenaries, but to 
this point they must have been hired piecemeal.
174
   
These units fought as separate units, based upon their origin.  They were a 
heterogeneous mix of whatever the local tradition dictated.  The ethnic Achaeans, as well 
as the Sicyonians under Aratus, were armed primarily with the smaller thureos shield, 
reflecting the tactics with which Aratus won most of his successes.
175
  The remaining 
League constituents each had their own martial tradition.  Some poleis might share in the 
thureos based equipment, but there is little information on the possible wide range of 
traditions.  Assuming uniformity would be a great mistake, and there is evidence that the 
great poleis such as Megalopolis, maintained Macedonian style equipment typified by a 
heavier brazen shield.   
Most references to Macedonian style Megalopolitans come from the period after 
the Battle of Sellasia.  Fighting with Antigonus Doson, Polybius reports that the king 
provided the equipment which the Megalopolitans used.   Five years later, they were 
noted as having bronze shields, just as they did at Sellasia.
176
  The only specific mention 
of Megalopolitan soldiers before that battle occurred earlier in the war, during the action 
in which Lydiades died.  Aratus had some limited success with his light troops, but would 
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not commit his hoplites.
177
  Lydiades, exercising his authority, led his own soldiers, 
horsemen, against Cleomenes.  To his cavalry he called forth to his countrymen to 
support him, many of which heeded his call.  These Megalopolitans fought and routed 
Cleomenes’ right wing, but fell apart in broken and wooded areas.178  The description is 
too vague for anything definitive, but its details conform to the performance one expects 
of a line of heavy phalangites.  In a war where Achaean soldiers were routinely defeated 
in open battle, the Megalopolitan troops broke a part of the Spartan army.
179
  As 
perennial foes to Spartan aggression, the Megalopolitans must have maintained forces 
capable of dealing with Spartan tactics.  The tradition of heavy infantry was clearly 
present in Megalopolis to a greater degree than in the rest of the Achaean army. 
The army was not only composed of elements with differing military traditions, 
but the participation of local levies was at some level dependent on the inclination of that 
locality, at least in the early period.  The nonparticipation of certain groups is difficult to 
detect, but one certainly finds the incumbent strategos greatly affecting the employment 
and composition of the army.  As the native polis of Aratus, Sicyon consistently bore a 
heavy military burden.
180
  Their contributions were so heavy that it took an inordinate toll 
on their population levels.  During the strategia of Aristomachus of Argos, the Achaean 
army met the Spartans at a place called Pallantium.
181
  This location was east of 
Megalopolis. This territory, then, was the furthest east an Achaean army appeared before 
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Cleomenes made his dramatic gains in the Argolid.  This was probably because the new 
strategos chose to march his army through his home region to pick up Argive units and to 
ensure the defense of that region.  Cleomenes probably moved his army to intercept them 
from his position in Megalopolitan territory.
182
 
 In the field, the army was composed of various tactical units.  The Achaeans 
conformed to the general Hellenistic trend of combined arms with their own heavy 
emphasis on flexible infantry.  It is unclear how deep specialization ran in the Achaean 
citizen units; mercenaries may have supplied the specialized roles as they sometimes did 
in other contemporary armies.
183
  Light infantry made up an important component of the 
Achaean army under Aratus.
184
  His most successful military operations all involved 
surprise assaults on walled poleis and fortresses with light troops.  The position of 
hipparchos certainly points to the importance the cavalry possessed even in the original 
ethnic koinon; Achaean cavalry continued as a present force in any major engagement 
and most minor ones.
185
  And lastly, the weakest component of the Achaean military was 
their heavy infantry, referred to as hoplites in the general sense of that word.
186
  Missile 
troops, possibly fighting as part of the light infantry, are seldom mentioned. 
 Mercenaries constituted a pivotal force within the Achaean army from the 
admission of Sicyon, and perhaps before.  This is far from surprising, since Aratus had 
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direct and continuous connections to mercenary leaders from his boyhood.  The actions 
Aratus took to depose the tyrant Nicocles included hiring a few mercenaries from the 
foremost of the brigands, Xenophilus.
187
  As the League gained power and wealth, it 
increasingly relied upon greater mercenary forces.  There are no attested figures before 
the Social War, but the scattered mentions make the importance of mercenaries clear.
188
  
As the Social War neared its conclusion with mixed success on the part of the Achaeans, 
Aratus convinced them to establish a standing force of eight thousand infantry and five 
hundred cavalry mercenaries.  This is compared to 3300 citizen forces.
189
  The 
dependence on mercenary forces overburdened the League’s finances, and allowed it to 
afford its army only in good times.
190
 
The person who led this martial force was the strategos autocrator.
191
  The allure 
of commanding the forces of the whole League has already been directly cited as one of 
Aristomachus’ enticements.  But of course, not every tyrant could be the supreme leader 
of the League.  Lesser posts existed, possibly with some regional significance.   
The position of hypostrategos, literally an under general, existed both as the direct 
subordinate of the strategos autocrator and as independent commanders in their own 
right.
192
  The examples of independent command come from one particular area, the 
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northwest corner of ethnic Achaean lands, around Patrae and Dyme.  Here, of the two 
named hypostrategoi, both are from the region.  The sources report that they command a 
unit called a synteleia, which appears to be a designated subregion within the League that 
is larger than a single polis.  This may, however, represent a special circumstance.  This 
region of Achaea was hard hit by Aetolian-Elean raids and may have required special 
consideration, or as the originators of the renewed League they may have had a historical 
claim to special privilege.
193
  But the existence of a local subgroup commanded in each 
case by a local citizen represents another possible layer of authority with which to attract 
individual elites.  
There were also the remaining federals posts which, though not strictly military, 
assisted in the co-option of elites from across the League.  When Aratus journeyed to 
meet his new ally, Antigonus Doson, a group called the demiourgoi accompanied him.
194
  
This body was the effective executive council of the Achaean League.  Heavily involved 
in foreign policy, the demiourgoi had some sort of oversight power on the strategos 
autokrator but generally stayed in the bureaucratic center of the League, Aegium.
195
  Of 
the few documents which have survived with references to the demiourgoi, two were 
proxeny decrees.
196
  This power suggests that the demiourgoi had certain patronage 
powers, making this an attractive post in addition to its central role in Achaean 
government.  One may imagine the tyrant of Phlius, Hermione or some lesser place 
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serving in this capacity, where they might continue to maintain themselves in their home 
poleis through the greater patronage resources of the League.   
Further down the scale, the Achaeans possessed a number of lesser offices, and 
also the League legislative bodies.  All complex societies have lower level functionary 
positions and places for legislative back benchers.  Hellenic poleis certainly possessed 
such positions, but the increasing number of federal posts served to bind more individuals 
to the federal state, just as the top federal positions bound the formally parochial premier 
leaders.  These positions were often the federal extensions of preexisting polis practice.  
There were the boards of nomographoi, or law writers.
197
  And there seemed to be a body 
of standing judges which were empaneled as necessary.
198
  Other low level posts existed 
in the federal treasury, with one confirmed treasurer.
199
  This position was fairly 
unimportant due to the rudimentary nature of regular Achaean finances, even by the 
nature of the Hellenistic age.
200
  And of course there were opportunities for individual 
involvement with the federal state in the legislature. 
There were two legislative bodies, the representative boule and the primary 
legislature, the ekklesia.  Though democratic in form, these bodies were functionally 
oligarchic, most likely passed down from the original Achaean institutions developed in 
417 and strengthened in 367 BCE.  The most striking example of a statutory limit on 
participation within the primary legislature was the unusually high age requirement of 
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thirty years of age.
201
  Additionally, though not directly attested, there very well may 
have been a property qualification to full political participation.  The general low number 
of total theoretical hoplites during the heyday of the League, 30 to 40000, suggests 
this.
202
  Population drain does not fully explain the losses from a region which actually 
fielded armies of this size and larger during the Classical period.  Since military service 
and political rights were commonly tied, the hoplite population must correspond to the 
politically active population. 
Aside from the formal laws regulating membership, the legislative organs of the 
Achaean League were functionally oligarchic.  The ultimate sovereignty of the League 
rested de jure in the full ekklesia.
203
  This was the body where all citizens could 
theoretically exercise their full civic right to weigh in on federal policy.  But the practical 
limitations of transportation skewed participation to those individual Achaeans with the 
economic means to both take the time away from gainful economic activity and travel to 
the assembly site.  This arrangement also favored those League citizens who lived the 
closest to the assembly site, which was still at this period normally held in Aegium.
204
  
Extraordinary meetings occasionally met in other locations, but for the most part the 
proximity to Aegium contributed to one’s ability to influence policy.   
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The second legislative body, which might be considered derivative of the first, 
was the boule.  Although the boule was a critically important body of the Achaean 
government, much remains unknown such as size and composition.  Analogous boulai 
numbered into the hundreds and in federal contexts was often composed of proportionally 
representative delegates.
205
  These analogies are more persuasive in that the Achaeans 
assessed their extraordinary taxes, eisphora, based upon a proportional system.
206
  In 
every other federal analogue, the proportion was based not on actual population numbers, 
but on the amount of representation a particular locality had in the federal boule.
207
  The 
system reflected population in as much as a greater population could support higher 
taxes.  The stresses of the Cleomenean War and later, the Social War, revolutionized the 
relationship between these two legislative bodies, and rendered them truly separate.   
On the one hand, the ekklesia was the font of true sovereignty, while the boule 
acted as a kind of steering committee.  In both name and function these two bodies 
corresponded to the Athenian boule and ekklesia, only on a federal scale.
208
  And just as 
in the Athenian case, the Achaean boule assumed greater importance as time passed.  
Only in certain circumstances did the boule operate as a legislature in its own right.  The 
boule had already developed an independent authority before the reorganization of the 
League, probably under the influence of Spartan pressure.  The earliest reference to an 
Achaean governmental apparatus comes from an inscription which mentions the 
demiourgoi and the boule in the context of a treaty with a “Coronea.”209  While ultimate 
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decisions of peace and war remained with the ekklesia, as it would down to the final 
dissolution of the League, the minutia of diplomatic agreements were ceded to the boule.  
A good example of the relationship between the two bodies occurred during the opening 
of the Cleomenean War.  Aratus, in his capacity as strategos autokrator, convened the 
leading men of government
210
 to decide overall policy against Cleomenes.  This group 
included the boule.  As the Spartans escalated their hostile behavior, a full meeting of the 
Achaeans was convened which declared open war.
211
  During the full meeting, the boule 
probably acted as a steering committee.  The boule had a certain freedom to act, along 
with the executive leadership, but on the issues of war and large troop deployments, the 
ekklesia was required. 
Beyond federal posts which could only appeal to the loyalty of Achaean political 
elites, the Achaean League had a range of other civic benefits.  The Achaean application 
of citizenship and federalism stood out from the Hellenic world, and fostered the long 
term unity of the League.  Each federal citizen possessed legal and property rights 
throughout the League, and each League constituent theoretically possessed equal 
political rights.  The practicalities of demographics and geography dictated that certain 
League constituents were better positioned to take advantage of federal institutions, but in 
theory every polis or mera had an equivalent share of political power.   
Any male citizen of the Achaean League over the age of thirty could fully 
participate in the affairs of state.  He could attend the ekklesia by right, or find himself 
selected for the boule if found worthy by his polis.  But should he live too far away from 
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Aegium and lacked the time or resources to make the trip, he found himself divorced 
from League policy.  He was also liable for military service, but was rarely called up 
unless the enemy passed near his polis or he was unlucky enough to be a Sicyonian.  If he 
were a man of great means, he might serve in a federal post.  But unless he was a close 
political ally of Aratus, he could not hope to attain the highest offices.   
Beyond the political rights of an Achaean, each citizen had certain reciprocal 
rights, such as to property, intermarriage and legal redress.  All of these existed during 
the early League.  In the initial stages, however, only the elites could make much use of 
these prerogatives.  Aratus is reported to have owned a house in Corinth,
212
 but he was 
literally at the top of Achaean political society.  Evidence exists for another early 
Achaean citizen, Heiro of Aegeira, having owned property in Argos.
213
  Within the ethnic 
Achaean homeland, there may have been greater participation in these rights initially, 
since they had long enjoyed them.  But they would prove critical over the long term to 
binding the propertied classes of the new member states. 
Reciprocal marriage rights were a very concrete tool of unity.  Instead of 
intangible notions of general kinship within an ethne, marriage would create an actual 
kinship tie.  This exchange of privileges occurred in a number of places throughout the 
Hellenistic, and the earlier Hellenic world, and was not unique to the Achaean League.  
Their contemporaries, the Aetolians, granted it to members of their League, and are 
recorded exchanging these rights with nonmember allied states such as the 
Acarnanians.
214
 This exchange, termed epigamia in Greek, was granted quite frequently 
between specific poleis and either individuals or other favored poleis. The Achaeans 
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simply generalized the concept, eliminating the need for legislative action on each new 
extension. 
These concrete benefits were essential to the durability of the League, but they 
existed alongside other less tangible unifying forces.  The origins of a Hellenic koinon lay 
in the unity of individual ethne.  The revolutionary aspects of the Achaean model existed 
within, not outside of that core tradition.  The incorporation of disparate poleis into a 
single political organization was astounding, but the whole process was cloaked in the 
traditional ethnic framework.  Each new member swore to take the name and ancestral 
laws of the Achaeans, hence becoming Achaeans.  In a strict technical sense, the League 
was merely incorporating consanguine peoples just as they had during the reformation of 
the League before Aratus.  This is, of course, preposterous, but the gesture was clearly 
deeply meaningful to the Achaeans.  The assertion of a fictional kinship would be 
insufficient for stability on its own, but it provided the intellectual and religious 
underpinning for the quite radical step which so many poleis took.   
This assertion of kinship took the form of an oath sworn by the representatives of 
the joining locality and the elected leadership of Achaea.  The best example for this is the 
Orchomenean decree, dated to 234 BCE which shows how the new League constituents 
had to become “Achaeans.”215  This language is mirrored in Polybius’ description of the 
Achaean League in his second book.
216
  Clearly, League ideology posited that all 
members, regardless of their former ethnos affiliation, were brought into the greater 
whole of the Achaean nation.  Unfortunately for the unity of the League, this oath, while 
                                                             
215
Larsen, Greek Federal States, 310.  P. J. Rhodes with David M. Lewis, Decrees of the Greek States 
(New York: 1997), 98 γιγονότι τωι κοινωι τωι των Αχαιων. 
216
Polybius, 2.38.4.  Walbank, Commentary I, 221. 
58 
 
important, was far from completely successful in eliminating particularism.  The practical 
application of this sworn integration came in a few tangible forms.   
Moving from the least to perhaps the ultimate in tangible objects, coinage has 
long been the most ubiquitous medium available to premodern states for the expression 
of political values.  Minted coins were the most often seen and utilized work of 
government artists.  The artwork on either side of the coin presented the goals or ideals of 
the minting authority.  Achaean practice was no different.  Achaean coinage reflected the 
unique federal system which they had developed, allowing for some autonomy but also a 
mark of federal unity.  There was no federal mint; each polis had the right to coin, but to 
the federal standard.  The reverse of a League coin, most commonly an Aeginetan 
Triobol, contained both the League monogram and that of the minting polis.
217
  This 
practice admirably asserted League political values.  While maintaining local traditions in 
iconography, the polis also asserted its participation in the greater whole. 
In clear demonstration of how much competition the League had for local 
loyalties, most poleis continued to mint their own, local coins without reference to the 
League.  In coin hoards twice as many pieces have been found marked as purely Argive 
coins than with the federal monogram in addition to local Argive features.  In a similar 
vein, coins with the symbol of the Arcadian League make up a surprisingly large 
number.
218
  These reflect the continued local pride felt by most Peloponnesians.  Even the 
Arcadian League symbol makes good sense when one considers Megalopolis.  As a 
relative parvenu among the ancient cities of Arcadia, the reason for Megalopolis’ 
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founding was to serve as the capital of a united Arcadia.  This local variation is 
important, but it is also important to note that they still struck to the federal standard. 
The integration of the Achaean economy, as facilitated by common weights and 
civil freedom of movement, was both a tangible economic benefit as well as another 
intangible connection between member states.  The internal migration of propertied 
elites, as opposed to laborers, could not help but solidify the political class within the 
Peloponnese.  This was a long-term process, and during Aratus’ tenure as leading 
statesman it had not yet come to pass.  But the economic motives to migrate slowly 
wrought a changed view of the greater Achaean citizenry.  Through everyday good 
dealings with members of another community, individual Corinthians, Argives, 
Sicyonians or others came to identify a bit more with his fellow Achaeans when 
compared to other, more foreign groups. 
Another point of common association was common religious practice.  As it had 
been before the reorganization, the political and religious center of the Achaean League 
was the polis of Aegium and the precinct of Zeus Homarius.  As previously noted, 
regular sessions of the ekklesia were held in Aegium, though with emergency sessions 
taking place elsewhere.  Additionally, as new members joined the League, they must 
have participated in the activities of the federal cult at the precinct of Zeus Homarius.  
What effect this participation had on the minds of new members is immeasurable.  The 
Homarion faced much competition for the allegiance of new citizens.  Argos, Corinth and 
even the parvenu, Megalopolis, had local cults with far more influence on local minds.  
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But over time, just as with the civil, economic and legal rights, Zeus Homarius did find a 
wider acceptance and helped bind the League together.
219
 
Each of these institutions were internal to the League and helped it grow and 
prosper.  The League also existed in a particular international environment, which 
pressed on League constituents and League targets.  The most influential of these 
pressures of course came from the Hellenistic monarchies.  As the largest political bodies 
of their day, these kingdoms could, if they focused on an area, make all local 
developments moot.  Their armies could destroy any of the communities of Greece.  They 
too, however, had their own concerns to worry about, mostly each other.  In the Achaean 
context the most notable aspect of royal influence became financial. 
Subsidies from the Hellenistic monarchs underlined much of the character of 
Achaean institutions.  Monies were directed either at an individual, or toward a state 
project through the good offices of a particular native citizen.
220
  This concentration of 
wealth in few hands directly contributed to the establishment of the tyrannical elite.  In a 
critical way, the corresponding reduction in importance of lesser individuals created the 
circumstances where a few might have the option of redefining themselves into both 
locally preeminent and also loyal to a greater political body. 
The transformational power of wealth has a long and obvious pedigree.  From the 
Hellenic context, however, the examples of first the Persian king, and then Philip II of 
Macedonia give analogues to this development.  The Persians had large stores of specie.  
As the principle Greek states of the day were democratic poleis, Persia would, in addition 
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to direct subsidies to states, would directly bribe leading politicians.
221
  Philip II did not 
have as large a store of precious metals, but he did have large grazing lands and flocks of 
animals.  While contending with his primary Greek antagonist, Athens, he gifted herds of 
cattle, horses and sheep to certain politicians of limited means.
222
  Through his shrewd 
gift, Philip instantly elevated these men to elite status, leapfrogging them past other 
politicians whose family holdings in Attica, though impressive locally, could obviously 
not compare to the gifts of the Macedonian king.  This strategy, whether used as 
efficiently as Philip II, continued to reshape local power dynamics, just as it had done in 
Athens.   
Achaemenid Persia and Philip II elevated some politicians in some cities to help 
shape local politics.  But the sudden deluge of gold and silver into the Greek homeland 
following the exploits of Alexander III transformed Greek political life.  The liberality of 
Alexander III and his successors toward their soldiers instantly elevated their status, and 
anyone connected to them.
223
  But much specie was retained at royal courts.  So 
important was this wealth that the basis of the Kingdom of Pergamum’s independence 
rested on a 9000 talent treasury which happened to be in the city.
224
  This wealth, when 
directed at individuals in Greece, elevated them far above their fellow citizens.  These 
individuals could use their new wealth to hire mercenaries and secure their position as 
tyrants of their localities.  This did not eliminate the need for local support.  The narrative 
of the revolving door of Sicyonian tyrants indicates that more than mercenaries were 
                                                             
221
As just one example, Xenophon, Hellenica, 3.5.1 describes the bribery of key politicians in key poleis 
which led directly to the Corinthian War.   
222
Timothy Howe, Pastoral Politics: Animals, Agriculture and Society in Ancient Greece, (Claremont, 
California: 2008), 45. 
223





necessary for stability.  But this tyrannical elite did weaken the local citizenry to the point 
where their assent was less important.  These new conditions were critical to the initial 
unity of the Achaean League.  This lowered threshold of civic assent, as much as any 
other factor, allowed fractious Peloponnesian poleis to join in a common government. 
These institutions complemented admirably the strategies employed by Aratus in 
expanding the renewed League.  Each institution had something to contribute to the 
overall emphasis on tyrannical elites.  Aratus’ first instinct was to dominate through his 
military.  Luckily, when this proved too difficult for League resources, the other 
institutions served commendably to entice these tyrants to join Achaean ranks.  These 
tyrants were, for decades, the preeminent political actors in their poleis due to their 
elevation by the wealth of the Hellenistic monarchies. 
 
Aratan Strategies of Unity 
The tyrannical elite, established and maintained by Macedonian arms, was the 
principle target of Achaean foreign policy.  Both carrots and sticks where employed 
toward these ends, with the treatment of Lydiades of Megalopolis and the tyrants of 
Argos serving as the best examples.  Taking the Argives first, Aratus targeted both the 
elder Aristomachus and Aristippus specifically for assassination.  And though Plutarch 
says it was some slave, one cannot rule out that Aratus had a hand in Aristomachus’ 
murder.
225
  During his relentless attacks on Argos, already described, Aratus arranged to 
lure Aristippus into an attack on Cleonae.  The tactics to this point were typical of Aratan 
warfare, but once the two forces had joined battle Aratus singled out and pursued 
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Aristippus to his death.
226
  His successor, Aristomachus, chose a different path within a 
few years, joining the League.  His decision could not have been unaffected by the recent 
deaths of his father and grandfather.   
The narrative of the Argive tyrants is given fairly full coverage, but the decision 
of Lydiades is presented as wise and independent, coming from a man of noble 
lineage.
227
  This misses the Achaean intimidation which must have had a great 
influence.
228
  The Achaean army had already annexed territory deep into Arcadia.
229
  And 
just as in the case of the Argives, Aratus probably sent assassins after Lydiades.  Plutarch 
asserts Aratus was laying plots just as Lydiades made his decision to renounce tyranny.
230
  
Whether it was truly gratitude, or whether negotiations had taken place ahead of time, the 
addition of Megalopolis to the League was followed in the next election with the 
selection of Lydiades as strategos autokrator.   
Power was the primary carrot for the tyrannical elite.  Megalopolis and Argos 
were powerful cities, and the only allure the League possessed was the offer of greater 
power still.  Aratus was the example of a single man exerting disproportionate influence 
throughout the League.  During the negotiations for Aristomachus to unite his polis to the 
League, Aratus pointed to the example of Lydiades, and the opportunity the Argive 
would have to become strategos of a state more powerful than his own.
231
  The choice 
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was stark: death or constitutional ruler over a greater territory.  This choice was all the 
more compelling if one did not truly have to give up one’s tyranny, as Aratus had clearly 
not done in Sicyon. 
There is good evidence that this was the case.  Lydiades continued to be the 
leading citizen of Megalopolis.  During the Cleomenean War, the Spartans were 
encamped outside of Megalopolis.  Aratus, the serving strategos autokrator, did not elect 
to attack.  But Lydiades called upon the army of his polis and attacked the Spartans, 
where he ultimately fell.
232
  His death obscures his continued dominance in Megalopolis.  
Aristomachus controlled Argos after it joined the League, but he lived to see Aratus shut 
him out of power.  As the war deteriorated for the Achaeans, Aristomachus made another 
decision.  Just as he had joined the League when it suited him, Argos opened its gates to 
Cleomenes III when the tide of events favored the Spartans.
233
 Polybius accuses 
Aristomachus of turning Argos over to Cleomenes at the time when the League needed 
his support the most.
234
  Returning to the stick, Aratus and the Achaeans put him to death 
once they had recaptured Argos, demonstrating that they felt he bore the guilt for the 
defection of that polis.
235
 
As counterintuitive as it may seem, Aratus had made the Peloponnese safe for 
tyrants, but only anti-Macedonian ones.  Through aggressively courting the tyrannical 
elite, the League acquired not only the big prizes of Megalopolis and Argos, but also 
Hermione, Phlius and other undocumented poleis which certainly were governed by 
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tyrants.  The Achaean League did not displace Macedonian garrisons, it had replaced 
them.  After paroling his Macedonian mercenaries, Aristomachus could rely at tense 
moments on Achaean mercenaries.  Aratus could maintain his position in Sicyon, a polis 
which had seen a revolving door of tyrants, with authority from the League in addition to 
soldiers.  Though their rhetoric was diametrically opposed to this notion, the Achaeans, at 
least at that point, were held together through the consensus of tyrants. 
 
The Limitations of Aratus 
This clear focus on the tyrannical elite sheds light on the failures of the Aratan 
system.  Polities with regimes which shared power among any number of citizens greater 
than one maintained their independence from the Achaeans.  By 228 only Elis, Messene 
and Sparta remained independent in the Peloponnese.  Just outside the peninsula, Athens 
also stood aloof despite continuous pressure from Aratus.  The tactics developed to 
appeal to a single ruling individual had much less force over these more democratic 
states.    
In addition to the detailed narrative of Aratus’ advances on Argos, Plutarch 
spends much time on his equally obsessive raids on Attica.  With Megara and Aegina 
already a part of the League, Athens was as much the next step as Argos.  While Athens 
conformed in many ways to the usual Achaean target, it retained a fundamental 
difference.  Aratus had a single responsible target for his usual tactics, Diogenes, the 
Macedonian garrison commander.
236
  But underlying Macedonian force was a still 
effective Athenian self-governing class.  Athenian civic institutions had not atrophied in 
                                                             
236
Plutarch, Aratus, 34.4. 
66 
 
the hundred years of intermittent Macedonian interference.  This civic tradition was fully 
capable of taking over from the outgoing Diogenes. 
 Elis and Messene generally escaped Achaean aggression on account of their 
position as clients of Aetolia.
237
  Sparta similarly was in alliance, or at least friendly to 
the Achaean League.  Past relations were no guarantee of safety, however.  When 
conditions were propitious, Aratus attacked Elis.  One could argue that Cleomenes III 
began the conflict which would bear his name.  Sparta attacked Achaean territory first, 
and Cleomenes’s ambition was certainly extensive enough on its own.  Aratus’ response, 
however, to the fortification of disputed territory was a raid on Orchomenus and Tegea, 
equipped with scaling ladders.
238
  He attempted to slip away unnoticed when the attack 
failed, indicating that he knew that Cleomenes’ actions did not warrant his response.  
Aratus’ first instinct was always to attack.   
Bold attacks heralded his career, first in Sicyon than later at Corinth.  Negotiation 
was always a second resort or worse.  The personal theme one detects in Aratus is his 
need to dominate affairs.  His military and political tactics are best suited to aid Achaea 
in the environment of tyrants, but they aided himself most of all.  One may speculate on 
his motives, but as the leader of a relatively small polis, Sicyon, Aratus needed to 
maintain his authority in the face of the more powerful new members of the League.  The 
best result of the expansion, from Aratus’ perspective, was Corinth.  A powerful polis in 
the fourth century and earlier, Corinth had suffered greatly under Macedonian 
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domination.  Aratus “freed” the city, yet there is no mention of any Corinthians in League 
service.  Aratus effectively neutered the polis with his garrison on the Acrocorinth.   
Aratus could not effectively influence democratic states, nor would he permit 
himself to diminish in influence.  These weaknesses were hidden, so long as Aratus 
contended with his tyrannical neighbors of similar resources.  Achaea reached the natural 
limits of his system just as a resurgent Sparta rose to challenge Achaean dominance in the 
Peloponnese.  The tactics at which he excelled were mismatched against his Spartan 
opponent.  Cleomenes III proved too tough to defeat, and too domineering to come to a 
peaceful agreement.  There could be no repeat of the integration of Lydiades or 
Aristomachus.  The subsequent conflict would expose the shallow nature of League 








COLLAPSE AND BROADENING  
OF LEAGUE SUPPORT 
 
 As the Achaean polity absorbed new members and expanded its power through 
strategies of elite co-option, reforming kings came to the throne in Sparta and led that 
ancient polity back into relevance.  The timing was inauspicious for Peloponnesian unity, 
as that peninsula was too small for two growing rivals.  The ejection of Macedonian 
influence and the shifted focus of Aetolian politics left the stage set for a confrontation.  
The war would expose Achaean weakness, but its result would grant the League the long-
term space to develop a system to incorporate a more broad-based swath of its citizenry.    
 
The Cleomenean War 
 As Thucydides might phrase it, the underlying cause of the Cleomenean War was 
the growing power of Achaea and Sparta.  There have already been many allusions to the 
beginning of the war.  Cleomenes received or seized the eastern Arcadian poleis and 
fortified the Athenaeum, a temple in the disputed territory of the Belbina.
239
  This was 
followed by an Achaean invasion, headed by the newly elected strategos, Aristomachus.  
Prevented from offering battle by Aratus, though they outnumbered the Spartans four to 
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one, the Achaeans withdrew.
240
  In the next year, with Aratus as strategos, the Achaeans 
raided Elis but found a Spartan army present, which defeated them.  This defeat was 
compensated by the surprise attack and capture of Mantinea.
241
  Another embarrassing 
defeat occurred in front of Megalopolis, but a Spartan attack near Orchomenus was 
defeated, and its commander captured.
242
 
To this point Cleomenes III had mixed success against the Achaeans, and for the 
most part their state held together well.  Disagreements among the ruling elite, especially 
between Aratus and Lydiades of Megalopolis, created enough disunion for Cleomenes to 
win more victories than he might have otherwise.
243
  But the threat was not serious 
enough for those disagreements to spell doom, as Cleomenes could only muster as many 
as 5000 men at best.
244
  The major Achaean defeat at Lycaeum had some compensation 
in the surprise capture of Mantinea from Spartan control.  After the Spartan victory at 
Laodicea, before Megalopolis itself, there were recriminations within the League, but 
without any real loss of territory.
245
  This situation was radically altered with Cleomenes’ 
seizure of absolute authority in Sparta and the enrollment of several thousand more 
citizens.   
The king opened the following campaign season with the recapture of Mantinea.  
In keeping with his typically bold plans, Cleomenes took this opportunity to invade 
western Achaea.  At Hecatombaeum, near Dyme, he inflicted the most serious defeat the 
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Achaeans had yet experienced.  Cleomenes defeated the full Achaean citizen levy, and in 
the aftermath of this defeat the Achaeans essentially sued for peace.
246
  Aratus and 
Cleomenes negotiated in good faith, and there was a real prospect of a settlement.  But 
due to circumstances and the temperaments of each statesmen, peace was not established.  
Each blamed the other for the failure, but while Cleomenes had done much to silence any 
opposition he had in Sparta, Aratus was at his lowest ebb politically.   
After the breakdown of these talks, the subsequent year’s campaign season saw 
the collapse of the Achaean position.  From Mantinea, which had recently fallen back 
into his hands, Cleomenes began the campaign with a strike on Sicyon, believing there 
were traitors willing to turn the city over to him.  When this failed he turned to the west 
and sacked the ethnically Achaean city of Pellene.
247
  Argos invited Cleomenes into their 
walls; Phlius and Cleonae accepted garrisons.  The Corinthians, despite Aratus’ actual 
physical presence in the city, bent over backwards to ingratiate themselves to Cleomenes.  
Though not stated, the Corinthians had clearly had enough of the domination of 
Aratus.
248
  The remainder of the Argolid followed suite in quick succession.
249
  All that 
remained to Aratus and his Achaeans was the original Achaean homeland, his home city 
of Sicyon, and Megalopolis and its dependents.   
At the high tide of his success, Cleomenes besieged Sicyon, very likely confident 
of ultimate victory.  But after all his victories, and the many poleis that had voluntarily 
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surrendered or which he had stormed, Cleomenes could not break Sicyon.  Reaffirming 
the axiom that ancient cities tend to withstand a siege unless betrayed from within, 
Sicyon withstood the might of the Spartan army for three months.
250
  The dire straits in 
which the Achaeans found themselves resulted in what had been unthinkable, the request 
for aid from the Macedonians.  The armies of Antigonus Doson swept Cleomenes out of 
the Argolid, and placed the Achaeans into a subordinate position from which they never 
recovered.   
 
Explanations of the Achaean Collapse 
The causes of this near total collapse of the Achaean position deserve careful 
scrutiny.  The first and most basic answer might be that the Spartans were truly militarily 
superior, a proposition which has much evidence for it.  Even before his reforms, 
Cleomenes III defeated the Achaeans at Lycaeum and Ladoceia.
251
  After he augmented 
his phalanx with his newly enfranchised Spartiates, he won the smashing victory at 
Hecatombaeum.  However, as the siege of Sicyon demonstrates, the Spartans need not 
have captured so many cities as they did; while the Achaean field army was clearly in a 
shambles, this did not affect the integrity of the walls of Argos or any other city.   
The idea that the revolutionary programs of Cleomenes inspired oppressed 
Achaean citizens to favor the Spartans has been popular with many modern historians.  
Aside from modern preoccupation with class struggle, however, the only direct ancient 
testimony is a comment by Plutarch.  Since so much scholarly opinion has turned on 
Plutarch’s comment, it bears quoting in full. 
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Now, there had been agitation among the Achaeans, and their cities were eager 
for revolt, the common people expecting division of land and abolition of debts, 
and the leading men in many cases being dissatisfied with Aratus, and some of 
them also enraged at him for bringing Macedonians into Peloponnesus.
252
 
 Plainly stated, the proletariat yearned for economic assistance, and the leading 
men, oblivious to class concerns, turned on patriotic pride.  This explanation has a certain 
resonance in today’s world, given the power of class consciousness in the modern era.  In 
the context of Plutarch’s Lives, such a statement has another, separate resonance.  Writing 
during the apex of the Roman Empire, Plutarch was privy to Roman historical traditions, 
including the Conflict of the Orders.  Plutarch was writing the biographies of famous 
Romans as well as Greeks, and the conflict was self-evident there.  
Greece certainly had problems with economically disadvantaged citizens.  The 
Archaic Age is replete with struggles over debt.  Additionally, during the height of the 
Peloponnesian War, parties divided roughly along class lines, democrats and oligarchs. 
They routinely invited in either Athens or Sparta, depending on their political affiliation.  
But even in the classical period, alliances hardly conformed to the party line.  Athens had 
no compunction about attacking a democratic Syracuse when they thought it suited them.  
Since that time of dubious class conflict, the Hellenistic power struggles had neutered 
democratic factions across Greece.  The new organizing principle of different factions 
was in support or opposition to one of the Hellenistic monarchies.  Instead of just 
describing the facts, while paralleling famous Greeks and Romans, Plutarch had a 
positive interest in making these similarities seem more apparent.  He directly pairs the 
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reforming Spartans, Agis IV and Cleomenes III with the Roman revolutionary Tribunes, 
Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus.
253
 
There is a better alternative explanatory force among the sources.  The closest 
contemporary source available, Polybius, does not mention lower-class sedition as a 
prime reason for Achaean collapse.  He states the reasons quite plainly: the three 
battlefield defeats of Lycaeum, Lodoceia, Hecatombaeum and the decision by Ptolemy to 
transfer subsidy payments from Achaea to Sparta.
254
  In fact, the subsidy loss is singled 
out first, though chronologically it probably came last.  It most logically occurred after 
the battle of Hecatombaeum and the public appeals for Antigonid support from certain 
League members.   
Since it is Polybius’s main explanatory fact, the role subsidies played within 
Peloponnesian politics bears more analysis.  The general poverty of the Peloponnesus is 
highlighted during one of Polybius’s polemics against the pro-Spartan historian, 
Phylarchus.  Altogether, he asserts that even after the decades of prosperity at the time of 
his writing, there was less than 6000 talents worth of wealth.  This relative affluence is 
contrasted to the sorry state of a region which had suffered decades of foreign 
depredations and internecine warfare.
255
  After the classical period, citizen levies were 
never sufficiently large or professional enough to hold a Greek polity sovereign under the 
intense pressures of the Hellenistic state system.  The viability of nearly all states 
depended on their ability to raise and finance mercenaries.  The specie with which the 
Hellenistic monarchies flooded the Hellenic world transformed both the internal 
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workings of the poleis but also raised the bar on external threats.  In the Peloponnesus, as 
everywhere else, more money was needed to stay in power locally and ward off foreign 
invaders. 
In this situation, the Ptolemaic subsidies had an enormous impact on the abilities 
of any given state.  At the start of his career, before he had established his grand 
reputation, Aratus received twenty-five talents from Egypt.
256
  That a little known 
Sicyonian adventurer could command such a sum demonstrates the enormity of 
Ptolemaic involvement and support of anti-Macedonian forces.  Further, aside from 
serving in the cavalry, the next recorded service to his homeland was another mission to 
Ptolemy.
257
  With the judicious use of his native city’s most marketable product, her art, 
he secured one hundred fifty talents more.
258
  In comparison, the pay for a Macedonian 
army of 7200 men, 6000 Macedonians and 1200 mercenaries, was fifty talents for three 
months, not including food rations.
259
  For the symbolic gift of several pieces of world 
renowned artwork, Ptolemy III had given the Achaeans the means to put a sizable army 
in the field for nine months. 
In addition to these lump sum donations, probably far from the only ones sent, 
Aratus received a yearly stipend of six talents.
260
  This figure has led some to think of 
Ptolemy III as parsimonious in his subsides.  Given the aforementioned lump sum 
payments, and the pension Cleomenes III received after Antigonus III had vanquished 
him, twenty-four talents annually, one gets the impression that Ptolemaic subsidies were 
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the main source of specie to the impoverished Peloponnese.
261
  Aratus was wealthy 
enough to contribute twenty talents to the disbanding of Athens’ Macedonian garrison.262  
More impressively, he was able to supply enough household silver plate and gold jewelry 
to hold in surety for a sixty talent loan, facilitating the seizure of the Acrocorinth.
263
  His 
personal wealth was founded on Ptolemaic gifts, and the fear of losing this sure flow of 
subsidies was a major reason for Aratus’ rejection of Antigonid assistance.264 
 The switch of Ptolemaic subsidies from the Achaeans to Cleomenes III did not 
precipitate the crisis, however; it only aggravated a deteriorating situation.  Had the 
poleis held firmly together, they might have continued to suffer some losses, but nothing 
as catastrophic as what actually occurred.  The element that was missing was a sense of 
collective identity behind which the different poleis might rally.  But Achaean unity to 
this point was crafted at an elite level, and functioned mostly through self-interest.  With 
Achaean power collapsing, and the Achaean military establishment in a shambles, Aratus 
had few carrots and sticks left to use. 
Looking through the lens of Plutarch and Polybius, one tends to get a myopic 
picture of Achaean politics focused on Aratus.  On numerous occasions, Polybius 
especially represents all major decisions spouting from Aratus’ careful planning.265  This 
obscures the real political adversaries Aratus had within the League.  The admission of 
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the powerful poleis, Megalopolis and Argos, added new foreign policy imperatives and 
new leading statesmen to contest the policies of Aratus and Sicyon.  Aratus could not 
tolerate any reduction in his influence, and these conflicts gave Cleomenes III the space 
to develop his domestic power. 
A good indicator of the political division within the Achaean body politic is the 
very question of war with Sparta.  Flatly speaking, Aratus did not want it.
266
   With the 
hindsight of the Cleomenean War and the problems the Achaean League continued to 
have with the Spartans, down through their defiant attack on Sparta in spite of Roman 
warnings, it is difficult to keep the perspective of earlier Achaean policy.  In fact, Aratus 
was pro-Spartan.  Although he controversially dismissed Agis IV when considering a 
battle against the Aetolians, the fact of Agis’ presence points to an early alliance.267  
Further, looking at his behavior, Aratus always chooses the less confrontational policy, 
even to the point of allowing the invading Cleomenes III to escape, so as to leave open 
the possibility of reconciliation.
268
  This lack of aggression strikes one as contrary to 
Aratus’ nature.  The prospect of war with Sparta was not distressing on its own.  Aratus 
feared the authority it would grant his anti-Spartan rivals, who would and did take a 
leading role in directing the conflict. The whole Cleomenean War represented a 
fundamental failure on the part of Aratus to deescalate a tense situation.   
The policy which most proves the extent of Aratus’s marginalization is the 
request for Macedonian aid.  If the introduction of the Megalopolitans, and their tyrant 
                                                             
266
 Plutarch, Aratus, 35.4. 
267
 Plutarch, Aratus, 31.1. 
268
 Plutarch, Aratus, 35.5.  The nonbattle of Pallantium probably had much to do with Aratan desire to 
deprive Aristomachus of glory, but on 37.1, before the walls of Megalopolis, Aratus, then strategos, only 
sallied to relieve the pressure on the walls, and refused a larger engagement.  Lydiades attacked, and Aratus 
refused to support him, unto his death.   
77 
 
Lydiades, reoriented League policy against the Spartans, it also added an element of pro-
Macedonian sentiment.  Megalopolis had a generally positive history with the 
Macedonian kingdom, which extended to the support Megalopolitan tyrants received just 
before Lydiades joined the Achaeans.
269
  The addition of Argos, also somewhat pro-
Macedonian and for similar reasons, created a block strong enough to overcome Aratus’ 
objections, though not at all places and times.  This latent bias was unimportant so long 
as the fortunes of the League continued to wax.  With the serious reverses during the 
opening years of the Cleomenean War, this new fault in League politics became far more 
evident.  As the war progressed, Aratus’s influence continued to wane, even as his main 
rival, Lydiades, perished.   
As the war effort worsened, the diehard anti-Spartans, particularly the hard 
pressed Megalopolitans, looked to outside succor.  Plutarch and Polybius relate a 
notorious secret mission to Antigonus Doson, involving Aratus and his two 
Megalopolitan associates.
270
  It is generally taken to be a desperate act of a hard pressed 
statesman alarmed at the specter of social revolution.  At closer scrutiny this picture does 
not add up.  As has been discussed above, the notion that Aratus was alarmed at 
Cleomenes’ social reforms is not clear cut.  The machinations behind the embassy of 
Nicophanes and Cercidas are not clear cut either.   
Polybius presents a deeply confused narrative with contradictory elements.
271
  
Most noteworthy is Aratus’ supposed desire for the secrecy of the mission, and the public 
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request for permission from the League by the Megalopolitans.
272
  When one 
disentangles the obviously public aspects of the appeal from the supposedly backroom 
planning, a very different, and more consistent, picture emerges.  The Megalopolitans, 
frustrated with the unrelenting Spartan attacks, which the Achaeans failed to prevent, or 
ameliorate, officially send a mission to Antigonus Doson.  They requested League 
permission, which was granted, and they received a favorable reply from the king.  The 
Achaean assembly was prepared to accept the assistance, but Aratus, whose staunch, 
lifelong policy had been opposition to Macedonian influence, delivered a speech against 
the aid.  He asserted that it is better to rely on one’s own strength than to call in another, 
and only at the last extremity should such assistance be sought.
273
  Aratus carried the 
argument for that day.   
The record of Aratan duplicity, and quiet diplomacy with the Macedonian court, 
can only have one source.  Polybius himself notes that Aratus left these dealings out of 
his memoirs, because his plans were such closely guarded secrets that he had “to do and 
say things quite contrary to his real intentions.”274  The alternative view is that Aratus 
held no such plan, but the concept of the wily Sicyonian influencing behind the scenes fit 
all too well with the narratives of one historian.  Phylarchus, the pro-Cleomenes III 
writer, is the probable source of the Aratan duplicity.  Since Aratus is his great villain, 
Phylarchus found it easy to believe, and hence write, that there was a long term plan to 
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reintroduce barbarous rule into the Peloponnese, cheating the virtuous and Hellenic 
Cleomenes III.
275
  Plutarch preserves some of the invective in his life of Cleomenes.
276
   
One would think that Polybius would reject the anti-Aratus slant which this story 
possessed, but within the context of Polybius’ other remarks, he transforms the alliance 
machinations into the perfect vehicle for his conception of a correct Achaean world view.  
Far from betraying Greece, Aratus secured true liberty and constitutional rule against the 
tyrannical Cleomenes.
277
  Antigonus Doson is consistently portrayed as a positive 
monarch, and his cooperation with Aratus perfectly foreshadows the greater partnership 
in pursuit of liberty, with the Romans.
278
  But just because Polybius found this narrative 
useful and fitting for his conception of Achaean history, does not affirm that Aratus 
actually followed a long term policy of rapprochement with Antigonid Macedonia.   
At every stage, including the first speech against outside aid, Aratus searched for 
an alternative to Macedonian aid.  It was only after the total collapse of the Achaean 
position that he relented and gave his full blessing to the pact.  When confronted with his 
volte-face, Aratus declared that he was merely following necessity.
279
  He had been 
outmaneuvered at the start of the war, and Cleomenes’ unwillingness to reach a 
settlement forced his hand even further.  In the end, it was not some great fear of social 
upheaval which compelled Aratus to submit to Macedonian suzerainty; it was in order to 
avoid political irrelevance that he threw himself behind the alliance.  Aratus refused to 
relinquish his position as leading statesman, even at the cost of his anti-Macedonian 
convictions. 
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What Cleomenes III exposed was that the Achaean League was not a grand 
federation, bound by common justice and humanity, but closer to an alliance of 
convenience between ethnic Achaeans, Aratus of Sicyon and all the other Peloponnesian 
tyrants.  As the situation deteriorated, the sources speak of poleis surrendering to 
Cleomenes III.  But just as their tyrants had joined their poleis to the Achaeans, it was 
these same men who in turn surrendered their walls to the Spartans.  Men such as Xenon, 
tyrant of Hermione, and Cleonymus, tyrant of Phlius saw the direction the wind was 
blowing and jumped ship. Given the circumstances, no polis outside of Achaea was safe.  
Even Megalopolis likely only remained committed to the League on account of its 
intense rivalry with Sparta.   
The Achaeans incorporated many poleis, including the powerful centers of 
Megalopolis and Argos, only on the basis of elite co-option.  This sudden expansion did 
not allow for any kind of close feeling to develop between the various poleis citizenries.  
After many more decades of common government, such fellow feeling must have 
developed, for Polybius expounds its ideals so eloquently.  Unfortunately, the 
independent political organization known as the Achaean League failed to inspire enough 
loyalty to see it through its first major crisis. 
 
Aftermath and Refocusing 
 The strategies of unity employed by Aratus had failed their trial by fire.  
Cleomenes III had exposed the Achaean League’s fundamental lack of a cohesive and 
collective identity.  The tactics of elite co-option which had worked so well in the 
expansion of the League had displaced the very force which made those tactics so 
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successful.  In the aftermath of the Cleomenean War, the Achaean League continued to 
exist under the protective aegis of Macedon.  This support was almost immediately tested 
again during the so-called Social War.  The League suffered further setbacks but 
ultimately succeeded with Macedonian support.  Over the following decades Achaea 
slowly clawed its way back into a stable and prosperous position.  Such efforts were 
aided by near constant Macedonian military support as the League reached its lowest ebb 
militarily. 
Aratus of Sicyon was indisputably both the catalyst and cause of the expansion of 
the Achaean League.  His strategies dovetailed with the tyrannical zeitgeist in the 
Peloponnese.  But as the situation evolved, largely stemming from Aratus’ own actions, 
the Aratan strategies ceased to be a reliable force for stability.  From this point onward, 
the unifying institutions within the Achaean system moved into greater prominence. 
Among these Achaean institutions, the military must again take pride of place.  
As always, the coercive power of martial force bound people to the central government 
should loyalty prove fickle, as it did for many League members.  The performance of the 
army continued to deteriorate under the leadership of Aratus.  Opportunities for surprise 
attacks faded, and pitched battles predominated.  The battle of Caphyae, the first 
engagement of the Social War, ended in disaster.
280
  Events got so out of hand that there 
was a tax strike.
281
  This performance would continue into the First Macedonian War 
until the death of Aratus and the rise of Philopoemen.  In each case, as the League neared 
military collapse, Macedonia would again step in and restore the situation.   
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The vicissitudes of Philopoemen’s life are unimportant here, but he engineered a 
complete reorganization of the old Achaean army.  The tactics that had worked so well 
for Aratus a generation before had long since lost their purpose.  Philopoemen is recorded 
as having discarded the light thyrseos shields and javelins. He exchanged them for the 
equipment of the heavy phalanx: full panoply with a heavy shield and the sarisa.
282
  This 
reorganization occurred with the full support of Philip V, whose resources were 
constantly drained in protecting a vulnerable Achaean League.   
The significance of this step was complex.  Beyond the political implications of a 
state better able to protect itself, this reorganization had an effect upon the loyalty the 
state could call upon.  Philopoemen, through whatever personal charisma and authority 
he possessed, forced the citizen levy to train for months before trying them in battle.  
After traveling city to city, Philopoemen assembled all the levies at one location for a 
final round of training.
283
  This bred an esprit de corps which was sealed by the victory 
over the Spartan tyrant Machanidas.  National victories tend to swell national pride, and 
loyalty to the federal government must have increased.  Men from the citizen levies, 
drawn from the propertied citizens, would feel a greater sense of united effort and 
accomplishment.  This rebirth of effective martial prowess was conducted under the aegis 
of Macedonian protection. 
Military victory has long formed a crucial path to legitimacy for states and 
statesmen.  Most modern nation states point to a historical victory, or in rare cases 
glorious defeat,
284
 as an example of national prowess and greatness.  The many 
“Achaean” citizens, who mostly thought of themselves as Megalopolitans, Argives or 
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whichever polis one might name, were far from a modern nation.  But they were one 
political community, and they had a narrative of their growth and prosperity.  Polybius 
and his work represent an iteration of that narrative. In the early League, the seizure of 
the Acrocorinth played a central role in another iteration of that narrative.  The results of 
the Cleomenean War must have upended this understanding of Achaean identity, with 
Corinth returned to Macedonia.  Its achievement was literally thrown down when 
Antigonus Doson had the statues of captors of the Acrocorinth in Argos destroyed, all but 
Aratus’, and put up those of the former tyrants instead.285  The poor showing during the 
Social War must have further depressed any patriotic feelings.  After nearly twenty years 
of disappointment, the victory over the by now decades long enemy, Sparta, in 207 BCE 
came as a startling change for the better.  Held in the protective embrace of Macedonia, 
the Achaean League had the time to rejuvenate and forge a better military force.  The 
new army developed by Philopoemen would continue to perform well for over a 
generation, standing as a source of pride and national unity. 
The period of Macedonian support provided the space for the League to move 
toward constitutional changes which began to broaden the possibilities for political 
connections.  Two changes are noted before the second Macedonian War in 200 BCE.  
One change was important, but only to military effectiveness.  The annual elections 
ceased to be held in the spring, and instead took place in the fall, thus eliminating that lag 
time between the start of campaign season and the installation of a new strategos.
286
  The 
second, and more consequential, change was the move to assemble the full ekklesia for 
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extraordinary meetings to determine war and alliances only.
287
  The boule would continue 
to meet regularly.  This change, theoretically radical in scope, aided in the balancing of 
League geography.  Formally, geographically close poleis could fill the ekklesia with 
their own citizens, giving them a greater share of the votes.  But with a regulated amount 
of councilors, all of them with the means to travel, the legislative branch of the Achaean 
League gained a balanced prospective.  This change also applied to the election of state 
officers, such as the strategos autokrator.
288
 
There was one final constitutional change with the obvious intent of including 
more outlying poleis into the political process.  Philopoemen, leading citizen of 
Megalopolis, pushed through a measure in 188 BCE to rotate the meeting site of the 
regular boule sessions.
289
  This change, brought about by an Arcadian after the death of 
Aratus, demonstrated that the weight of power had shifted away from the old centers.  
The law had finally changed to incorporate that fact.  Though this lessened the 
importance of the capital at Aegium, this does not necessarily mean that the city ceased 
all functions as a capital. 
Beyond the political changes, the growing utility of the economic and civic rights 
enjoyed by all League citizens was of incalculable importance.  As the decades 
progressed, regardless of constitutional changes, citizens of one polis began to move to 
economically more advantageous localities.  As much as any other factor, these rights 
broadened League support, as more citizens joined in the prosperity which the League 
engendered.  Unfortunately, details of this process are few, and its influence can be 
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observed in only a few places.  The most striking example of the greater mobility in 
economic and political life comes from a casualty list.  Preserved from Epidaurus, it 
includes the names of one hundred fifty six soldiers.  Only fifty three are classed as 
Epidaurians, while the others are termed either Achaeans or other residents.
290
  Far more 
Achaean citizens enjoyed the fruits of association, and the League began to exert a far 
greater hold on them.  Unfortunately this occurred only after the League had placed itself 
under the dominion of Macedonia, and then Rome.  
 One of the few areas which hint at the long term viability of the greater Achaean 
identity is the prestige of the religious cult to Zeus Homarius.  The few scraps of 
evidence for the continued worship of the federal cult were admirably assembled by the 
late F. W. Walbank.
291
  Archaeologists have found a stele which included the figures of 
Zeus Homarius and Athena Homaria in the Nile Delta, likely set by an Achaean 
mercenary.
292
  This attestation of personal devotion reveals individual loyalty, long after 
the League had lost all political relevance.  At the group level a number of northern 
Greek ethne plus the original Achaeans joined together in a league.  The membership and 
name of this league fluctuated, but a dedication exists thanking the Roman Emperor Nero 
for their liberty. The appellation of this League was Pan-Achaean, demonstrating the 
continued cache of this label.  Another inscription to T. Statilius Timocrates celebrates 
the Pan-Achaean games, and made provision to set up an inscription at the Asclepion in 
Epidaurus, and the Homarion.
293
  This Pan-Achaean League clearly retained some sense 
of continuity with the Hellenistic Achaean League.  The passage of time in addition to the 
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 The Achaean League arose within a favorable confluence of events, from which 
the Achaean ethnos especially benefited.  The League rose to regional prominence, 
uniting many of the fractious poleis of the Peloponnesus.  Contrary to its own narrative, 
the Achaean League did not attract these various poleis through the shining example 
provided in an equal democratic government.  A ruthless exploitation of the prevailing 
political climate delivered profound early growth.  Under the leadership of Aratus, the 
Achaeans targeted tyrants who were established through Macedonian force and an 
explosion of royally distributed specie.  This system could only continue its growth so 
long as the conditions remained the same.  But as Aratus confronted more consensual 
political systems and a resurgent power in Sparta, the League collapsed.  Propped up by 
Macedonian force yet again, the League developed in its cocoon for several more 
generations.  It finally garnered the unity and legitimacy in the years after the 
Cleomenean War, but by this point the might of Rome was too powerful for any Hellenic 
state to resist. 
 Achaea succeeded in the first place because, unlike most other ethnic federations, 
it was not opposed to accepting nonethnic members.  The key was twofold: first, the 
Hellenic world experienced stratification in its ruling elite, so much of the important 
decisions were taken by a single individual, a tyrant.  Second was the emergence of a 
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tyrant over a relatively powerful polis which was willing to hand over its full autonomy.  
Sicyon, with its own ethnically conflicted history, supplied the Achaeans with a catalyst 
and a statesman to flood past its ethnic borders.  Though less impressive than their later 
exploits, the admission of Sicyon to the League was the most consequential decision 
taken by the Achaean ethnos. 
 Under the leadership of Aratus, the League rapidly expanded through a direct 
targeting of Macedonian backed tyrants.  The crafty Achaean army was a threat to every 
tyrant in the region, in addition to the covert assassination attempts instigated Aratus.  
But the benefits of access to the greater patronage resources of the League proved highly 
enticing to lesser tyrants.  The ultimate prize was the position of strategos autokrator, 
which only the tyrants of Sicyon, Argos and Megalopolis attained.  The co-option of this 
tyrannical elite brought rapid growth, but also left the League vulnerable.  Through the 
jealous competition of Aratus, Lydiades and Aristomachus, the League failed to 
adequately defend itself. 
 Cleomenes III exposed the Achaean League as a fragile political construct.  The 
early years saw his Achaean enemies divided in their policy toward him, granting the 
Spartans important victories.  With his domestic situation solidified through foreign 
victory, Cleomenes III challenged the League more effectively.  This led to the collapse 
of the League, and the defection of most of its member states.  With nothing but selfish 
motivations holding the federation together, the League failed its first major challenge in 
spectacular fashion.  Only the return of Macedonian hegemony allowed the League to 
continue in a reduced capacity. 
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  Despite the loss of foreign policy independence, the Achaean League continued 
to mature and grow.  Its novel approach to League citizenship and the constitutional 
changes spread the benefits of the League to a broader swath of the citizenry.  The 
decades of continued existence garnered a degree of loyalty great enough to survive 
catastrophe.  The complete end of Achaean political importance was not accompanied by 
total irrelevance as in the case of many other regional associations. Into the Roman 
period, ethnic Achaeans and other Hellenes looked back nostalgically to the glory and 









The Achaean League is fairly well documented, particularly after the addition of 
Sicyon to the League.  The principal sources are Polybius, Plutarch and Pausanias, with 
additional information contained in various other classical authors, epigraphy and 
numismatics.   
 
Polybius 
Polybius serves as the primary source for the Achaean League.  As a League 
citizen who operated in the highest circles of the League, he was well placed to 
understand the internal workings of the League, as well as the policy and self-image of 
the League’s leading statesmen.  A Megalopolitan by birth, Polybius came of age after 
the death of the leading statesman, Aratus of Sicyon, during the time when fellow 
Megalopolitan Philopoemen dominated league circles.  His father, Lycortus, was a strong 
supporter of Philopoemen and propounded the view that Achaea ought to maintain its 
independence from Rome, following the letter of the law regarding treaty obligations and 
no futher.
294
   
Born sometime around 200 BCE, Polybius stands as the closest ancient writer to 
the events he describes.  In 182 BCE, Polybius received the distinct honor to carry 
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Philopoemen’s ashes during his funeral procession.295  It was in the context of the great 
general’s death that the Achaeans elected Lycortus to the highest federal position, 
strategos.  Polybius, himself, later attained the second highest position, hipparchos, just 
before the outbreak of the Third Macedonian War.  It was in the aftermath of this struggle 
that Rome found the Achaean League’s neutrality too hostile, and deported one thousand 
leading Achaeans to Italy, including Polybius.  This exile, though interrupting a 
promising political career, has forever enriched the understanding of this period.  In his 
newly acquired leisure, Polybius turned his attention to preserving what he considered the 
momentous changes of his day.   
His biography aside, Polybius was a complex and serious historian.  His stated 
purpose is to explain the rapid rise of the Romans, both the means and the system under 
which it occurred.
296
  The implicit purpose is to explain to a Greek audience how to 
operate in a political environment totally dominated by Rome.
297
  The Histories are 
organized to incorporate all of the major political events in the Hellenistic and Roman 
worlds starting in 220 BCE.
298
   Later ancient historians refer to his work as the best 
source for the times he covers.
299
   
He has certain biases, however, which have become axiomatic.  Polybius, the 
Achaean from Megalopolis, takes special pride in his polis, and his koinon.  Though they 
are not the main focus of his history, he sets aside much space to detail Achaean early 
history.  The other side of this coin is that he clearly dislikes his fatherland’s enemies, the 
Aetolians and the Spartans.  Viewing the wider Mediterranean, Polybius generally favors 
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 Livy, 30.45. Conveying great respect through litotes.   
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the Romans, but does not go out of his way to condemn their enemies, the Carthaginians 
and the Hellenistic monarchies.  Further, Polybius was also an aristocrat.  While praising 
his homeland as a democracy, Polybius has a dim view of the proponents of the radical 
democracy represented by classical Athens.
300
 
As an Achaean patriot, Polybius was the only writer to discuss the reformation of 
the Achaean League; all other accounts follow his outline.  His sources regarding early 
Achaean history were first and foremost the Memoirs of Aratus.
301
  Otherwise he had 
local traditions and interviews with participants for the years after 220 BCE.  One 
important aspect to note is that due to his deep familiarity with the Achaean government, 
Polybius often leaves out aspects of the federal system the knowledge of which he takes 




 This Boeotian aristocrat and priest relays much highly useful information through 
his famous Parallel Lives.  The Lives of Aratus, Philopoemen and Cleomenes III most aid 
the understanding of this period, but references in several other Lives flesh out odd bits of 
Achaean history.  Writing in the late first century of the Common Era, Plutarch lived 
during the heyday of the Roman Empire.  Though a competent historian, his stated 
purpose is not history but the exploration of the lives of his subjects.
302
  As such, he crafts 
his narratives to demonstrate moral failings and virtues.  Through the vagaries of 
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transmission, however, Plutarch remains the chief source for a number of leading 
statesmen, and the period in which they lived. 
 As an historian living years after most of the men he described, Plutarch culled 
his material from preexisting sources.  He editorializes, but typically takes cues from his 
primary source concerning a given life.  This development is most striking in his 
contrasting treatment of Aratus and Cleomenes III in their respective lives.  For the 
Aratus, Plutarch clearly follows the Memoirs or Aratus himself.  He does chide him for 
letting in the barbarian Macedonians, but only for a brief paragraph.
303
  In the Cleomenes, 
however, Plutarch attacks Aratus more thoroughly, and attributes vanity and jealousy to 
his policies.
304




 The biographies of Hellenistic Greeks seem to be more of an afterthought to 
Plutarch compared to their Classical counterparts.  In the rest of his work, the Moralia, 
references to Classical Greeks and their paired Romans far outnumber the Hellenistic 
pairings.
306
 The Classical period biographies required greater care in composition, since 
every educated Greek had an intimacy with that subject matter.  By contrast, interest in 
Hellenistic history and figures had waned considerably in Plutarch’s period.  He 
comments in his biography of Aemilius Paulus that he started his Lives for others, but 
continued them for himself.
307
  This continuation most likely contained all of the 
Hellenistic subjects, which were not in vogue.  These circumstances allowed for greater 
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flexibility in those biographies, since fewer Greeks had a firm stance on how those men 
should be conveyed.   
 
Pausanias 
The Periegesis of Pausanias is a valuable and unique work which sheds different 
insights into many obscure regions of Greece.  Beginning in Athens, Pausanias “travels” 
to all of the regions of Hellas, describing the local sites and stories.  His work has long 
been mined for stray comments which fill in important facts.  There has been a movement 
to examine Pausanias on his own terms, writing a particularly vivid work which is about 
travel and yet more.
308
  His methods involve visiting the sites he describes and inquiring 
about local histories and stories associated with those sites.  His sections on Achaea, 
Sicyon and parts of Arcadia reveal important pieces of information.   
Generally, however, Pausanias relates few genuinely independent pieces of 
information.  And what does exist is often presented without a regard for chronology.  
For example, Pausanias records a battle fought near Megalopolis between the allied 
Megalopolitans, Achaeans and Sicyonians under Aratus on the one hand, and the 
Spartans under King Agis on the other.  It remains unclear when exactly this battle 
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 The nature of Achaean coinage prevents it from filling in much historical data, but 
it does demonstrate an official show of unity among League constituents.  This even 
extended to poleis forced into the League, such as Sparta.  The League used a modified 
Aeginan weight standard, which was traditional in many parts of the Peloponnese.  This 
contrasted with much of the rest of the Hellenistic world, which generally used the Attic 
standard, with the large exception of Rhodes, which maintained its own standard, 
befitting that economic powerhouse.
310
  The reverse of the League coins in these 
examples contained both the League monogram and a local symbol.  The League 
generally struck silver coins, but some bronze coinage has been discovered.
311
  The coins 
below represent poleis from different regions. 
 
 
SNG Vol: VI 760 Fitzwilliam Musuem 
State: Achaea Mint: Corinth 
Obverse Description: Laureate head of Zeus l. Reverse Description: League monogram in 
olive wreath; above, Pegasus. 
Period: First half of 2nd cent -200 -150 
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Struck Silver Hemidrachm 
ID: SNGuk_0601_0760 
 
SNG Vol: VII 1088 Manchester University Museum 
State: Achaea Mint: Patras 
Obverse Description: Zeus laur. Reverse Description: League monogram in olive wreath; 
below, dolphin. 
Reverse Inscription: PA – A, Reverse Secondary Inscription: LX 
Period: First half of 2nd cent -200 -150 
Struck Silver Triobol Weight 
ID: SNGuk_0700_1088 
 
SNG Vol: VII 1089 Manchester University Museum 
State: Achaea Mint: Sicyon 
Obverse Description: Zeus laur. Reverse Description: League monogram in olive wreath; 
below, dove. 
Reverse Inscription: N - I 
Period: First half of 2nd cent -200 -150 
Struck Silver Triobol  
Reference: 
Title: The Agrinion Hoard Type: Monograph Auth/Ed: Thompson, M. Publisher: ANS 






SNG Vol: VII 1090 Manchester University Museum 
State: Achaea Mint: Sparta 
Obverse Description: Zeus laur. Reverse Description: League monogram in olive wreath; 
to left and right, Dioscuri caps. 
Revere Inscription: LA 
Period: First half of 2nd cent -200 -150 
Struck Silver Triobol Weight: 2.2 
Reference: 
Title: The Agrinion Hoard Type: Monograph Auth/Ed: Thompson, M. Publisher: ANS 
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